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Improving NATO Support to Future Air Advisor Operations



**Joint Air Power
Competence Centre**

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FROM:

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SUBJECT:

Improving NATO Support to Future Air Advisor Operations

DISTRIBUTION:

All NATO Military and Civilian Structures, NATO Nations and Partnership Cooperation Menu (PCM) Nations – Releasable to the Public

NATO has stated that it is committed to providing long-term political and practical support to Afghanistan via a new post-2014 mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces. Additionally, the 2010 NATO Strategic Concept highlighted the need to develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance. Therefore, after the conclusion of combat operations in 2014, it is imperative that NATO addresses the requirement to sustain an enduring partnership with Afghanistan. It must also address the requirement to train, advise and assist non-NATO nations where common interests are shared with NATO or NATO security interest are involved.

The Aviation Security Force Assistance (AvSFA) capability addressed in this study is an important aspect of meeting these requirements. It not only can improve internal and regional security and stability but can create an environment for improved economic development as well. This insightful and informative document makes many challenging, yet essential recommendations to help develop and realize this important capability. NATO must begin work on implementing these recommendations as soon as possible in order to expeditiously create a valued, respected and noble capability that is in harmony with the honourable history of previous NATO engagement operations.

Although this document is not specific to the mission in Afghanistan, the findings and recommendations apply to the mission to train, advise and assist Afghan National Security Forces, post-2014. Additionally, they seek to have relevance to and application for all theatres and areas where NATO would benefit by having the capability to assess, train, advice, equip and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration.

We welcome your comments on our document or any future issues it identifies. Please feel free to contact my staff via email: contact@japcc.org.

Joachim Wundrak

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Partnership building has been and will be an important component of NATO's overall strategic approach. The NATO 2010 Strategic Concept specifically states that partnership building will be a key element of NATO's future strategic requirement. All three essential core tasks listed in NATO's current Strategic Concept (collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security) are supported by a robust SFA capability. Despite this, NATO currently lacks a unified concept to meet this strategic requirement. The JAPCC was requested by the NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A) to perform a study regarding NATO's ability to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration. The objectives of this study are to define the terms 'Air Advisor' and the Air Advisor mission and determine the anticipated future mission requirements. It then identifies the gaps between those requirements and current capabilities and makes recommendations on how best to fill those gaps.

Methodology

The data in this study was gathered from a variety of sources. Questionnaires were received from current and former members of NATC-A from a variety of nations and positions to include a former NATC-A Commanding General. Personnel from the NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) Concept Development Branch, NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), the United States Air Force (USAF) Air Advisor Academy (AAA), USAF HQ/A3O-Q Irregular Warfare Division, the USAF HQ AETC/A3Q Expeditionary Training division, United States Air Force Central Command (USAFCENT)/A3T Air Advisor Training Division, and the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance (JCISFA) were interviewed. Information from NATO public websites, relevant, unclassified Coalition/Alliance, Joint, and National doctrine, guidance and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTP) were referenced.

RAND Corporation studies, open source articles, research reports, and research papers on SFA and Air Advising were studied.

Definitions

Regarding the definition of the 'Air Advisor mission', the term was determined to be limiting in that advising only covered a fraction of the mission requirements. (The requirements include organize, train, equip, advise, mentor, assist, etc.) Based on this, it is proposed that this term be replaced by 'Aviation SFA' in this document. A definition for AvSFA was developed using ACT's proposed NATO definition of SFA. The term AvSFA is defined as 'all NATO activities that develop or directly support the development of local forces and their associated institutions to improve their airpower capabilities'. NATO Air Advisors are defined as 'personnel participating in the NATO mission who provide assistance to local forces and their associated institutions to generate and organize, train, enable, advise, and mentor foreign security forces and their supporting institutions to improve their airpower capabilities'.

The unique tasks and activities associated with improving a foreign nation's airpower capabilities are what make AvSFA unique from SFA. The 2011 US Air Force Global Partnership Strategy defines a term it calls 'Aviation Enterprise Development' (AED), which provides insight on these unique AvSFA tasks and activities. AED is defined as 'the plans, programs, and activities undertaken to develop the system of systems necessary for a nation to optimize employment of national aviation resources'.

Recommendations

The goal of AvSFA efforts must be congruent and coordinated with an overall NATO strategic SFA program. These efforts must be informed by the common strategic goals of the Host Nation (HN)¹ and NATO, strengthen international and regional security and when required, deter and defeat aggression. The AvSFA capability can be an important tool in NATO's peacetime engagement activities, during times of

crisis or in irregular warfare operations. By synchronizing AvSFA efforts with the engagement efforts of other NATO political and military bodies, NATO can improve the ability of designated nations to achieve and sustain internal security, spur economic development, and enhance regional stability. If these efforts are successful, NATO contingency response requirements can be reduced or eliminated.

NATO must use the lessons learned from previous SFA operations to build a standing team of SFA expertise that it can use when the requirement is needed. NATO's goal must be to build a comprehensive and coherent AvSFA capability that is supported not only through the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP) process but by involved leadership and sound guidance. The AvSFA mission must be a component of NATO's overall SFA strategy and should be used in coordination with other NATO SFA efforts. NATO must develop AvSFA doctrine and TTP that provides NATO Air Advisors with sound guidance that is applicable to all areas where they may operate. NATO can choose to use the relevant documents from member nations that have experience in the mission as a reference for development of this guidance. Most importantly, once this doctrinal foundation is developed the distinctive mission requirements and unique challenges of NATO AvSFA operations must be considered in the guidance.

NATO leadership must develop a staff structure that understands the mission and properly advocates for it in the NDPP process. In addition, it must foster interoperability using standardized doctrine and TTP. These staff elements must address a myriad of AvSFA mission requirements. These include the development and advancement of policy and doctrine, co-

ordination of AvSFA efforts with other SFA efforts, coordination and management of the defence planning process in support of AvSFA requirements and development of AvSFA TTP based on the lessons of previous AvSFA operations.

Although NATO has an AvSFA capability as evidenced by support for the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, it is currently done ad hoc. This leads to problems which could be lessened by adopting the proposed solutions and essential actions presented in the 'Recommendations' chapter. Based on the fact that NATO is currently engaged with 41 countries as partners and the strong emphasis the current NATO strategic concept places on partnership building, the anticipated future AvSFA mission requirement is expected to remain high. According to the NSHQ, there is an identified gap between the NATO's current AvSFA capability and the expected requirement. Although there are clear advantages to standing up a new unit to support the mission, it may not be feasible with existing fiscal constraints. The option most likely to gain support within NATO is to establish a specially trained and resourced organization developed from an existing General Purpose Forces (GPF) unit that can be tasked with this mission. This unit would receive additional, specialized training that is managed by an organization that maintains standardization of a formalized AvSFA training syllabus. By following the recommendations in this document, NATO can develop a generic and comprehensive concept for NATO contributions in developing a host nation's aviation enterprise and their supporting institutions.

1. Definition of 'Host Nation' from current Allied Administrative Publication (AAP-6); A nation which, by agreement: a. receives forces and materiel of NATO or other nations operating on/from or transiting through its territory; b. allows materiel and/or NATO organizations to be located on its territory; and/or c. provides support for these purposes.

PREFACE

NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept stated that providing a way to implement a 'comprehensive approach to effectively engage relevant nations during crisis management (and) take active steps to prevent crises from becoming larger conflicts' and having a tool to help 'create conditions for lasting stability'¹ was needed. It further stated that 'to be effective across the crisis management spectrum, it must develop the capability to train and develop local forces in crisis zones, so that local authorities are able as quickly as possible, to maintain security without international assistance'². NATO decided to use the term 'Security Forces Assistance' (SFA) to describe the process of training and developing local forces in crisis zones.³ Based on this requirement, NATO ACT was tasked to begin analysis of the topic.

The initial analysis determined that 'NATO currently lacks a unified concept for SFA'⁴. In early summer 2011, a Group of Interest (GI) was established internally in ACT with the task of conducting an SFA Conceptual Study, providing advice and recommendations for the way ahead. This conceptual study entitled 'Security Force Assistance (SFA) Conceptual Study – The GOTEAM Framework, An Example of "Thinking out of the Box"' is currently in work and seeks to:

... support the development of a comprehensive NATO Security Force Assistance capability through launching

a SFA Concept Development and Experimentation (CD&E) project with the following deliverables:

- Reports on NATO and national SFA practices through a combination of field research and previous/current SFA operations such as NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A), NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I) and NATO support to the African Union;
- NATO Security Force Assistance Concept utilizing the GOTEAM conceptual framework. This Concept should envision the collaborative application of both, NATO civil and military expertise when providing assistance;
- Amendment to Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4 – NATO Counterinsurgency (COIN) Doctrine with a revised chapter on SFA;
- SFA chapter for the emerging NATO Doctrine on Stabilization and Reconstruction.⁵

This aviation SFA study is a result of a request by NATC-A and focuses specifically on AED, but it seeks to complement ACT's more general SFA concept mentioned above. All aspects of the recommendations in this study seek to align with the findings in this ACT-led project.

1. NATO, *Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, Lisbon, (19–20 Nov. 2010), 19–20.

2. *Ibid.* 21–2.

3. NATO, *Development of a Unified NATO Security Force Assistance Concept*, Norfolk VA, (6 Jul. 2012), 2.

4. *Ibid.* 3.

5. NATO, *Security Force Assistance (SFA) Conceptual Study, The GOTEAM Framework – An Example of "Thinking Out of the Box"*, Norfolk, VA, (13 Mar. 2012), v.



NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressing the Munich Security Conference, 2012.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

1.1 Prelude

1.1.1 On 30 October 2012, the JAPCC received a Request for Support (RfS) from NATC-A to perform a 'study to determine if NATO can develop a capability to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration'. NATC-A currently provides the NTM-A with 'Air Advisors' to assist them with building the nascent Afghan Air Force with a capability to meet their distinctive operational requirements. Based on statements made during the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012, this requirement will continue past the planned 2014 date for withdrawal of combat forces from Afghanistan¹.

By definition, the NATO nations collectively have much more capability than any one individual member nation to meet this requirement. The necessity to provide training, advice and assistance to potential host nations is not exclusive to Afghanistan. It is one that is becoming more prevalent as NATO extends its reach outside of Europe and North America. The ability to provide air-centric training, advice and assistance to a nation's aviation organizations can improve internal and regional security and stability and thus, create an environment for greater economic development. It is also an important tool in the mentoring and development of relations with non-NATO host nations where common interests are shared with NATO or NATO security interest are involved. The importance of building these relationships now, for potential future NATO-led operations, is clearly highlighted in the statement below by Secretary General Rasmussen.

‘Our current operations have been a real-time, real-world driving force for improving our ability to work together – and, when necessary, to fight together. Not just among the twenty-eight Allies, but also with our partners around the world. Five in our Libya operation, seven in Kosovo, and twenty-two in Afghanistan. This is invaluable experience we cannot afford to lose.’

NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen,
Munich Security Conference, 2012

1.1.2 Partnership building has been central to the NATO mandate since its inception. Article 2 of the Washington Treaty, which conceived NATO in 1949, recognized the significance of international relationships to the security of NATO by stating, ‘The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.’² In the 1990 London Summit declaration, it was proclaimed ‘We recognise that, in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of its neighbours. NATO must become an institution where Europeans, Canadians and Americans work together not only for the common defence, but to build new partnerships with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the Cold War, and extend to them the hand of friendship.’³ The importance of partnership building is cited as a keystone in NATO’s current political agenda.

1.1.3 Specifically having the capability to assess, train, advise, equip and assist foreign aviation forces in air-power employment, sustainment and force integration (also known as AED) must be considered a key element to achieve this strategic objective. As General Norton Schwartz, former Chief of Staff of the USAF, stated ‘By developing the aviation infrastructure in nations such as Afghanistan, the United States and its allies can provide the connectivity necessary to improve governance and spur economic growth. As the aviation structure matures, it will enable inclusion into

the global economic market ... [T]here is an important role for Airmen in aviation development ... [E]ngagement, building partnership capacity, and allied integration will become increasingly more important as ways to prevent instability and respond to a crisis.’⁴ Additionally, as stated in a briefing authored by the Headquarters USAF’s Irregular Warfare Division (AF/A3O-Q), ‘a strategically planned and resourced AED capability offers the means to create constructive effects enhancing foreign policy, influence and freedom of action’⁵. NATO should look at the lessons of previous air advisor missions to determine if there are better, more efficient ways to execute them in the future.

1.2 Aim and Scope

1.2.1 The aim of this study is to assess the current capabilities within NATO to support the air advisor mission and identify the essential actions and requirements to guide NATO in improving support for this mission. To do this, it will seek to:

- Define the terms ‘Air Advisor’ and the Air Advisor mission (for inclusion in AAP-6) based on existing, implemented references;
- Determine the current and potential capabilities within NATO to support the Air Advisor mission;
- Determine anticipated future mission requirements and identify the gaps between the current capability and the expected Air Advisor requirement and advocate for inclusion in the future NDPP;
- Provide guidance in the development of a generic and comprehensive concept for NATO contributions in developing a host nation’s aviation enterprise and their supporting institutions;
- If required, produce potential solutions and identify essential actions and requirements to guide NATO on how to mitigate the identified gaps in supporting the current air advisor mission (e.g. propose an organizational structure and methodology) and for delivering this capability for future NATO-led Air Advisor missions;

- Establish a training methodology for Air Advisors in order to instruct supporting nations with standards to provide a uniformly trained airman to execute AED based on unique operational requirements.

For clarification, information outside the 'Recommendations' chapter that helps address the aims of this document are highlighted in italicized text.

1.2.2 This study looks at the NATC-A experience and other examples (e.g. NTM-I) to determine how NATO could leverage existing capabilities and experience to improve its ability to assess, train, advise, equip and assist foreign aviation forces in airpower employment, sustainment and force integration. This capability could also facilitate the integration of potential host nations in future operations or could provide an opportunity for NATO to increase its footprint in areas that would otherwise be reluctant to permit a NATO presence. Although this study was requested by NATC-A, the conclusions and recommendations are generic and applicable to all theatres and areas.

1.3 Assumptions

1.3.1 The current emphasis on building and sustaining partner capacity will continue to be a key focus of NATO, and will include a wide range of host nations, from those that are at-risk and underdeveloped to those who are traditional global partners.

1.3.2 Demand for Air Advising activities will always exceed capacity, creating the need for defined requirements and prioritization in order to best utilize available manpower and funding.

1.3.3 NATO Air Advising activities can be one part of the total security cooperation program in the HN, and will most likely be conducted in coordination with other security cooperation efforts.

1.3.4 Sustainable security, stability, and economic development of a nation-state in the early 21st century may be directly linked to their aviation resource capacity and capability.

1.3.5 An integrated approach to air advising within NATO will result in more effective and efficient assistance to host nations.

1.3.6 Identified nations wish to adopt a NATO doctrinal model versus adopting a model used exclusively by a single nation (i.e. US or UK)

1.3.7 Air Advising is not an exclusively special operations force mission. When combat is not involved, properly trained general purpose forces may be better suited for air advising due to their availability and level of technical expertise.

1.4 Methodology

The data in this study was gathered from a variety of sources. Questionnaires were received from current and former members of NATC-A from a variety of nations and positions to include a former NATC-A Commanding General. Personnel from NATO ACT Concept Development Branch, NSHQ, the USAF Air Advisor Academy, USAF HQ/A3O-Q Irregular Warfare Division, HQ AETC/A3Q Expeditionary Training division, USAFCENT/A3T Air Advisor Training Division and JCISFA were interviewed. Information from NATO public websites, relevant, unclassified Coalition/Alliance, Joint, and National doctrine, guidance and TTP were referenced. RAND Corporation studies, open source articles, research reports, and research papers on SFA and Air Advising were studied, as well.

1. NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration, Chicago, (20 May 2012), 2.

2. NATO, The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, (4 Apr. 1949), 1.

3. NATO, The London Declaration, London, (5–6 Jul. 1990), 1.

4. Gen Norton A. Schwartz, USA, Airpower in Counterinsurgency and Stability Operations, Prism 2/2, (Mar. 2011), 127–134.

5. USAF, A3O-Q, 'Aviation Enterprise Development' [electronic presentation], (6 Oct. 2012), accessed 12 Nov. 2012.



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An Afghan Air Force Fixed Wing Squadron crew chief marshals in a Cessna 208 returning with a medical patient at Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.

CHAPTER 11

Definitions

'Pure military skill is not enough. A full spectrum of military, para-military, and civil action must be blended to produce success. The enemy uses economic and political warfare, propaganda and naked military aggression in an endless combination to oppose a free choice of government, and suppress the rights of the individual by terror, by subversion and by force of arms. To win in this struggle, our officers and men must understand and combine the political, economic and civil actions with skilled military efforts in the execution of this mission.'

US President John F. Kennedy

In this chapter, the definitions for the Air Advisor mission, and the terms 'Air Advisor', 'Security Force Assistance' and 'Aviation Enterprise Development' will be

provided. These terms will be used throughout the remainder of the document and will be submitted for inclusion in relevant NATO reference documents (such as AAP-6). The definition of SFA is provided by ACT and is used as the foundation of the definition of the Air Advisor mission. AED is an important concept in describing the specific tasks and considerations associated with successfully accomplishing the Air Advisor mission. This term is currently not defined in NATO documentation.

2.1 Security Force Assistance

2.1.1 One of the objectives of this study is to propose definitions for the terms 'Air Advisor' and the Air Advisor mission. Since 'air advising' is a subset of SFA, agreed NATO definitions of SFA should be the foundation of the definitions of terms relating to the Air Advisor mission. The SFA Conceptual Study identified that there is currently no common term across NATO

that describes the process of providing military assistance to local security forces. Instead, different combinations of activities and terms are used. These terms include 'security forces capacity building', 'partnering indigenous forces', 'Operational Military Assistance' and 'Security Force Assistance'.¹ The SFA Conceptual study elected to adopt the term 'Security Force Assistance' to identify this process. Hence, this document will use it as well. This will provide standardization of terms in this document and facilitate integration into the SFA Conceptual study. The SFA Conceptual study provided the NATO definition of SFA below.

SFA is 'all NATO activities that develop or directly support the development of local forces and their associated institutions'².

2.1.2 A discussion regarding Foreign Internal Defence (FID) and how it relates to SFA is required in the study to clarify the term when it is used later in this document. The US Joint Publication (JP) 3-22, 'Foreign Internal Defense', defines FID as an operation that 'supports and influences the host nation's internal defense and development program'³. Examples of this include allied operations in Bosnia and Afghanistan to increase their internal defence capabilities. By contrast, NATO

forces assisting non-NATO nations to integrate their forces into NATO combat operations is an example of an SFA mission. It is assumed that the training (whether in support of FID or SFA missions) should be tailored according to the expected operating environment and a review of both FID and SFA doctrine, guidance and TTP have relevance in this study.

2.2 The 'Air Advisor Mission'

2.2.1 Based on the SFA definition, the term 'air advisor' and the 'air advisor mission' becomes limiting in that it only addresses the 'advising' portion of the tasks associated with the mission. Based on this, it would be more appropriate to use the term 'Aviation Security Force Assistance' (AvSFA) instead of 'air advisor missions'. The proposed definition of Aviation SFA is:

'... all NATO activities that develop or directly support the development of local forces and their associated institutions to improve their airpower capabilities.'

2.2.2 What makes AvSFA different from SFA? The distinctiveness of AvSFA lies in the unique aviation related tasks and activities associated with improving a HN's airpower capability. The 2011 US Air Force Global Partnership Strategy defines a term it calls 'AED'.

NATC-A Advisors discuss an upcoming mission with Afghan Air Force (AAF) Aircrew.



© US Air Force, Col Bernard Willi

AED is defined as 'the plans, programs, and activities undertaken to develop the system of systems necessary for a nation to optimize employment of national aviation resources'⁴.

2.2.3 The total aviation resource capacity and capability of a nation is defined by the sum total of all air domain resources including humans, aircraft, processes and infrastructure in both the civilian and military/security sectors. Modern standards that function to provide efficient, safe and effective employment of national aviation resources calls for infrastructure development that considers the civilian aviation sector and the military/security aviation sector of a nation as mutually supportive systems of an integrated air domain in developing nations. AED includes the tasks of developing capabilities such as opening and operating an air base; providing security for the airfield and facilities; establishing airspace management, command and control, and communications structures and architectures throughout the host nation; establishing logistics and supply systems; establishing crash and fire rescue, aeromedical, and consequence management capabilities; maintaining aircraft and ground equipment; performing pilot and crew training on assigned fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, and, ultimately, performing military aviation missions such as airlift, humanitarian assistance, reconnaissance, or even air to ground fire support.⁵ This list of tasks must be considered when creating a NATO AvSFA capability.

2.3 The 'Air Advisor'

2.3.1 Regarding the second objective of defining the term 'Air Advisor', what should those personnel who provide NATO with the capability to develop or directly support the development of local forces and their associated institutions to improve their airpower capabilities be called? Currently, the terms 'Air Advisor' or 'Air Mentor' are commonly used across NATC-A and NATO. The UK Joint Doctrine Note (JDN) 6/11 'Partnering Indigenous Forces' defines an 'Advisor' as 'some-

one who can recommend a course of action, offer advice, or inform another party, about a fact or situation' and a 'Mentor' as 'an experienced and trusted advisor who provides counsel and leadership to another person, or organisation, by agreement'⁶. Additionally, the 2011 US Air Force Global Partnership Strategy provides the following definition of an 'Air Advisor' as 'an Airman specially trained and educated to apply aviation expertise to assess, train/educate, advice, and assist foreign personnel in the development and application of their aviation resources to meet their national needs in support of US interests'⁷. Other SFA documents such as those drafted by the French do not formally define the personnel that support AvSFA missions. At the individual level, most Air Advisors take pride in the title⁸ and the term is currently understood and accepted. Therefore, the term 'Air Advisor' will continue to be used and the following definition is proposed:

NATO Air Advisors are personnel who participate in the NATO Mission that provide assistance to local forces and their associated institutions to generate and organize, train, enable, advise, and mentor foreign security forces and their supporting institutions to improve their airpower capabilities.

It is also proposed that the term replace 'Air Mentor' since that term is also common within the NATO community.

2.3.2 The terms 'Air Advisor', 'Aviation Enterprise Development' and 'Aviation SFA' will be used throughout the rest of this document. Also, they will be forwarded for inclusion in the NATO SFA Conceptual Study and the AAP-6, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.

1. NATO, Development of a Unified NATO Security Force Assistance Concept, Norfolk VA, (6 Jul. 2012), 2.
2. NATO, Draft NATO Concept for Security Force Assistance, Norfolk, VA, (30 Sep. 2013), 7.
3. US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense, Washington, (12 Jul. 2010), 1-5.
4. USAF, USAF Air Advising Concept, (3 Feb. 2012), 9.
5. Ibid.
6. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, GBR Ministry of Defence, JDN 6/11 Partnering Indigenous Forces, Shrivenham, GBR, (Dec. 2011), Lexicon 3.
7. USAF, 2011 Air Force Global Partnership Strategy, Washington, 38.
8. NATC-A, 'Air Advisor Project' [email to Col Bernard Willi], (30 Nov. 2013) accessed 30 Nov. 2013.



A Helicopter of the Slovenian Armed Forces in Action in Montenegro after Heavy Snowstorms in February 2012. The mission was conducted following a request from NATO's Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC).

CHAPTER III

Relevance and Importance of AvSFA to NATO

'If you do not seek out allies and helpers, then you will be isolated and weak.'

General Sun Tzu, The Art of War

In this chapter, the importance of AvSFA to an overall NATO SFA engagement strategy will be explained. Furthermore, the anticipated future mission requirements based on the current NATO strategic concept will be described. Finally, it reinforces the importance of AED to NATO and provides generic guidance on development of a NATO AED strategy with HNs.

3.1 Relevance and Importance of SFA to NATO

3.1.1 As stated in the Chapter 1, providing SFA to troubled nations or potential HNs that are relevant to Euro-Atlantic security is a key element in NATO's most current strategic concept. A robust SFA capability permits NATO to engage actively to enhance international

security, through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations; 'employ an appropriate mix of ... political and military tools to help manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they escalate into conflicts' and 'help consolidate stability in post-conflict situations where that contributes to Euro-Atlantic security'.¹ This is the reason for NATO's ardent interest in SFA and why ACT was given the task of conducting an SFA Conceptual Study to provide advice and recommendations for NATO's SFA way ahead.

3.1.2 As stated in the NATO Document 'Development of a Unified NATO Security Force Assistance Concept', 'the driving idea for the study was the hypothesis that "to train and develop local forces in crisis zones"' was a subset of the much broader NATO capability gap to provide SFA to foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. A comprehensive NATO SFA concept 'should extend beyond military forces, training and crisis zones to include the perspective of pre-emptive assistance, which could help to avoid future conflicts, establish a more stable international environment, and save the Alliance time, money and precious lives'². It concludes by stating 'For the long-term, Security Force Assistance is about developing partnerships

and should be regarded as a Smart Engagement, echoing and following NATO Secretary General's appeal for a Smart Defence. The concept of Smart Engagements might bring a new perspective to the one of Smart Defence and thus guide NATO's future functioning and development as an organisation, and as a security assistance partner.' Because of this keen focus on SFA within NATO, it currently has an expanding number of partnership programs with a variety of nations across the globe.³ Additionally, more information regarding the importance NATO is placing on SFA efforts can be found in the ACT developed SFA Conceptual Study. Based on these facts, it is clear that an SFA capability is an important element in the future of NATO.

3.2 Relevance and Importance of AvSFA

3.2.1 While SFA is an important element in the current and future strategy of NATO, the unique competencies of an AvSFA capability should be an integral subset of NATO's overall SFA strategy. The goal of AvSFA collaboration efforts with HN air forces must be congruent and coordinated with an overall strategic SFA program. They also must consider the common strategic goals of the host nation and NATO, strengthen international and regional security and when required, deter and defeat aggression. This capability can be an important tool in NATO's peacetime engagement activities, during times of crisis or in irregular warfare operations. By synchronizing aviation engagement efforts with those of other NATO political and military bodies, NATO can improve the ability of designated HNs to achieve and sustain internal security, spur economic development and enhance regional stability. If these engagement efforts are successful, it may reduce or eliminate the requirement for a NATO contingency response.⁴ Another benefit may be the smooth integration of non-NATO forces into NATO operations where common interests are shared.

Vignette

The British air mentoring experiences with Oman are a superb example of the unanticipated benefits the alliance might gain through AED operations. The UK

had provided Air Power mentoring to the Air Force of Oman from its inception to the present day. The close relationship between the two nations was of particular importance in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on the mainland US during September 2001. The joint UK and Omani exercise, Saif Sareea II, had been planned 4 years previously as the largest gathering of UK expeditionary forces since the first Gulf War. Its serendipitous timing (immediately following the 9/11 attacks) allowed the UK to exercise forces at the level of two armoured battle groups (with commensurate Air Power) in conditions that closely replicated Iraq and Afghanistan. Whilst the exercise proved to be of considerable utility to the UK forces, it was the Omani consent to the operational use of these pre-positioned UK and US forces in the initial Afghanistan campaign that was to prove invaluable in the coalition response to the terrorist attacks.⁵

3.2.2 The importance of AvSFA to NATO is highlighted in the NSHQ's Special Air Warfare Manual. It states that 'the primary reason many developing nations are unable to effectively deal with irregular threats to their sovereignty is that nearly all the nations at risk have surface based security forces. Developing nations rarely possess the Air Power needed to help their ground-based security forces find, fix, and finish terrorists or insurgent groups. The lack of capable Air Power means the HNs facing irregular/asymmetric threats cede the initiative and mobility advantage to the insurgents. Properly tailored air/aviation capabilities have been shown to help threatened nations regain the initiative and set the tempo for further counter-irregular forces and counter-insurgent operations by providing mobility, intelligence, and fire support for indigenous security forces. The result of these (operations) is that indigenous air/aviation forces develop and sustain the Air Power capabilities they will use to defend their own countries'⁶.

3.2.3 The Role of Air Advisors – Peacetime Engagement/Humanitarian Operations

3.2.3.1 NATO is expanding the number of NATO partnership programs across the globe. AvSFA operations can play an important role in making these partnership programs successful. Nations that may be reluctant to

permit a larger NATO presence may be more likely to consent to these smaller, temporary aviation training teams. These teams could focus on providing HNs with training on the non-lethal use of Air Power such as support to disaster response, civil search and rescue, humanitarian assistance, and non-combatant evacuation operations. Recent agreements NATO signed with Kuwait and South Korea and the level of interaction NATO has recently placed on working with Pacific nations could provide an opportunity for NATO to employ these teams. Many Asian countries historically cooperate with NATO and make significant contributions to operations.⁷ Also, members of the 'Partnership for Peace' (PFP), 'Istanbul Cooperation Initiative' (ICI), and 'Mediterranean Dialogue' (MD)⁸ nations could also be potential clients of these air advisor training teams. Today, NATO engages with 41 countries as partners. Many of these partners as well as other non-member countries offer substantial capabilities and political support for Alliance missions. In December 2012, 24 non-NATO countries contributed over 7000 troops to NATO-led operations.⁹ *Thus, the anticipated future mission requirements for NATO AvSFA capability is expected to remain high.*

3.2.3.2 The scope of each engagement will be different. The strategic nature of SFA should therefore, entail a whole of NATO approach and may be subject to North Atlantic Council (NAC) approval prior to Allied Command Operations (ACO) tasking. Interoperability, per se, particularly regarding aviation forces, would come at a significant cost, and therefore may not necessarily be a specified objective of an engagement. Regarding scope, every consideration should be given to the overall indigenous capability objectives that are desired by the engagement. For example, is the objective to build true enduring national military air capability in which NATO forces will continue future integrated military operations or is the only requirement temporary development such as building surrogate forces to conduct an immediate operation? The goals and objectives must be specified by the highest civilian leadership. Some engagements may be supportable using contractor solutions while others should only be accomplished using military forces.¹⁰

3.2.3.3 The dual-use nature of aviation infrastructure capabilities (i.e. both military and civilian use) may require that all AvSFA initiatives are worked in conjunction with the 'whole-of-government' team within the host nation.¹¹ A robust aviation enterprise can offer efficient and effective distribution of cargo and goods both within the country and to regional and global markets, improved access for government officials to remote areas of the country, and a transportation alternative to supplement the existing ground-based or waterborne infrastructure. Many developing countries not only have a poor road system, but the tyranny of distance, weather, and topography make aviation capability extremely valuable. Aviation capability may further enhance government legitimacy through scheduled medical visits to remote locations or aiding law enforcement (i.e. protecting the population against criminals such as by performing anti-piracy support for native fishing fleets). Additionally, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities can be unilaterally executed, which also enhances government legitimacy. People tend to support a government that is willing and able to provide critical services; especially in time of need. Finally, organic aviation capability is commonly a great source of national pride and national unity.¹²

Vignette

With the help of the NATC-A, AAF helicopters lent extensive support to several humanitarian missions in Afghanistan. They provided helicopter airlift missions to expedite construction of an orphanage in the remote Badakhshan Province and delivered of school supplies to the towns of Bamiyan, Kabul, and Panjshir. Members of the AAF interacted with local men, women, and children, who now saw that the Afghan military could operate freely in most areas of the country adding to their legitimacy as a national military force. Perhaps more importantly, the operations demonstrated that the Afghan government and coalition partners could act as agents of beneficial change. This personal contact with the Afghan populace offered tangible proof of the altruistic motives of the government and AAF, further discrediting Taliban propaganda describing the government and coalition partners as 'monsters' and adding credibility to the central government's claim of legitimacy.¹³



© US Air Force, Master Sgt Ben Bloker

An Afghan Air Force pilot and USAF pilot preflight an aircraft at Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.

3.2.3.4 The AED effort must be tailored to meet the needs, desires, and sustainment capabilities of the HN. The HN must have the fiscal base, infrastructure, and human capital required to operate and maintain the aviation-related capabilities that are to be developed. A holistic approach encompassing NATO military, government and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) assets focused on the needs and capabilities of the HN will produce a successful AED program in both the short and long terms. If these are not available internally, the HN must have the realistic expectation of being able to obtain assistance from other sources to assist in operating and maintaining these aviation-related capabilities.¹⁴

3.2.4 The Role of Air Advisors – COIN Operations

3.2.4.1 Nations have sought to use the unique capabilities of aircraft to support COIN operations almost since its invention. From the American experience in Mexico in the early twentieth century, the attempt by the European powers to retain their distant colonies,

the many civil wars since the end of World War One, up to and including current operations in the Middle East and Southwest Asia, the importance of Air Power in these operations has been well documented.¹⁵ As Group Captain Adrian Hill, GBR AF, Former Deputy Commander, NATC-A states 'Air Power is exceptionally well suited to provide effects to defeat insurgency and terrorism, whether this be through the traditional view of Air Power as a "kinetic effect", or through other less obvious, but equally important means such as: intra-theatre airlift and battlefield mobility, preventing the flow of illegal narcotics, or by demonstrating government support for their population and demonstrating an ability to respond to natural or man-made disasters'¹⁶.

Vignette

AAF helicopters assisted in ballot distribution and collection for Afghanistan in the Wolesi Jirga (Afghan Parliament) election in September 2010, delivering ballots to select, relatively secure locations throughout Afghanistan.

Although extremely high enemy activity precluded the delivery of ballots in a few locations, most areas did receive election ballots. In one instance, in the vicinity of the village of Dawlat Shah, Taliban forces attacked AAF aircraft with small arms and rocket propelled grenades as they attempted to deliver ballots to the village. After the successful delivery, the Taliban warned the AAF not to return to retrieve the ballots. Undaunted by the threats, NATC-A mentors formulated a plan to execute the mission and recover the ballots under cover of darkness. (Only a few AAF aircrews were qualified to fly the Mi-17 using night vision goggles, and they were assigned exclusively to the Presidential Airlift Squadron.) After hearing a briefing on the potentially dangerous mission, the AAF crew members eagerly volunteered and became part of the planning cell. Despite poor weather and the Taliban threats, two AAF Mi-17s, escorted by two US Army AH-64s, recovered the ballots successfully.¹⁷

3.2.4.2 Depending on the nature of the preparation provided by NATO Air Advisors, HN's can gain additional response options to a variety of potential crises. When a government friendly to NATO is struggling against an insurgent group, the same competencies that support the populace in peacetime provide legitimacy against an insurgent unable to address the basic needs of the masses. These competencies include improved use of Air Power in disaster response operations, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and air evacuation of non-combatants in areas where civilians are being threatened. Finally, in nations where combat hostilities are actively occurring, host nations can be trained to better employ intra-theatre airlift and battlefield mobility. This permits rapid movement of government forces where needed to contain insurgents and keeps isolated fighting from escalating. Even in locations with a modern road

Ballots Being Collected for the Wolesi Jirga (Afghan Parliament) Election in September 2010.



© US Air Force, Col Bernard Willi

system, air mobility can reduce the risk associated with improvised explosive devices, insurgent activity, and criminal elements.

3.2.5 The Role of Air Advisors – Integrating Non-NATO Forces into NATO Operations

3.2.5.1 For NATO, AvSFA operations improve the ability to integrate and interoperate with non-NATO entities during NATO led operations. A significant percentage of personnel and equipment in NATO led missions today come from countries outside NATO. It can sometimes even exceed the contributions offered by those of NATO members.¹⁸ These mutually beneficial international partnerships develop interoperable coalition capabilities that can become an important contribution in NATO-led military operations. For example, Qatar, Jordan, the UAE and Sweden actively participated in operations during Operation Unified Protector (OUP) despite the fact that they are not NATO members.¹⁹ Due to its being part of Europe, Sweden naturally has a close working relationship with NATO and NATO operations and is considered a ‘special partner’²⁰. Qatar, Jordan and the UAE do not possess such a special relationship. The ability to integrate the Air Forces of those nations into OUP combat operations required special effort. This special effort was provided by a unit of the USAF designated the 6th Special Operations Squadron (6 SOS).

3.2.5.2 The 6 SOS is a USAF combat aviation advisory unit whose mission is to assess, train, advise and assist foreign aviation forces in Air Power employment, sustainment and force integration. Small Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams of squadron advisors with a small logistical footprint help friendly and allied forces employ and sustain their own Air Power resources and, when necessary, integrate those resources into

joint and combined (multinational) operations. During 2009 and 2010, squadron detachments deployed to Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Jordan, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Korea, Thailand, Poland, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Mali, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Guatemala and El Salvador.²¹ It is fairly certain that the AvSFA efforts of the 6 SOS helped to familiarize these nations with US military procedures (and by extension, NATO procedures) which improved integration. These were an important factor in enabling the assimilation and integration of Jordanian, Qatari and Emirati forces enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973.²²

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RAF Personnel Provide Air Machine Gunnery Training as part of the Commonwealth Joint Air Training Plan, No. 23 Air School at Waterkloof, Pretoria, South Africa, January 1943.

CHAPTER IV

Findings

'Air Advising is a tough gig – it's not a pick-up game. It takes commitment, from both the advisors and those being advised for maximum effectiveness.'

Major General Michael R. Boera, Commanding General, Combined Air Power Transition Force, September 2009–September 2010

This chapter will present the findings of the study analysis. It will describe the current and potential capabilities within NATO to support the AvSFA mission and identify the gaps between the current capability and the Air Advisor requirement.

4.1 Tenets and Principles

Based on the analysis for this study, it is apparent that AvSFA is not a new concept. AvSFA has been employed by a number of NATO member nations throughout their history for a variety of objectives. Additionally, the

tenets and principles that apply to SFA in general (such as understanding the local culture of the partner nation, the importance of building personal relationships, and understanding the unique requirements of the partner nation, etc.) also apply to AvSFA. The questionnaires, after-action reports, assessments and other analytical resources obtained and referenced for this study reiterate the importance of these principles in AvSFA. These generic tenets and principles must be known and applied in AvSFA missions just as they should for other SFA missions. Lists of the tenets and principles of SFA can be found in a number of doctrine documents, field manuals, joint publications, etc. across NATO.¹

4.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Using an Alliance

4.2.1 Advantages

The questionnaires received from NATC-A provided awareness of the challenges associated with using an alliance versus a single nation to support this mission.




Iraqi Air Force firefighters at New Al-Muthana Air Base, Iraq, hone their skills during a C-130 Hercules class.

They also provided insight into the advantages. According to the members of NATC-A, using an alliance to support the mission allows each participating NATO nation to bring its own experiences, backgrounds and perspectives to the mission. This allows the NATO partners to learn from each other and share their positive as well as negative experiences and utilize the best practices from participating nations. Multinational operations provide a variety of perspectives, equipment, and experience in a culturally diverse group. This can bring more information, resources and ideas to accomplish the mission. This, in turn increases the probability of successful methods being developed. Combined AvSFA aids in the dissemination of already proven methods previously developed by a single nation that may have more experience on a given topic (e.g. operation of equipment they may be more familiar with, logistically focused operations, AvSFA operations in general). It also reduces the likelihood of repeating previously made mistakes which can result in the use of ineffective techniques. Finally, using an alliance to support these missions adds local and global credibility to the

mission. It adds local credibility because the populace is less likely to see the effort as one nation imposing its will on the HN. It also adds global credibility by displaying a visible commitment to the world community that the effort to improve the security and stability of a HN is a worthwhile endeavour. Despite these advantages, combined AvSFA efforts must not be allowed to devolve into bureaucratic efforts in which action is taken by consensus and the main objective becomes to not offend or appear to marginalize any one nation's contribution.

4.2.2 Disadvantages

4.2.2.1 Language Challenges with HN Forces. It was cited that English instruction provided to the HN should not be presented as a language of 'foreign forces' but as the language of aviation. It was also stated that for Afghanistan in particular, the lower ranking personnel are sometimes not literate in their native tongue. This means providing English training may not be effective or even relevant depending on that person's job. It may therefore be a waste of



Slide from NATC-A Mission Brief depicting the nations represented as of 26 November 2012².

resources depending on NATO objectives for that nation. For example, the pilots and air traffic controllers must always be capable of speaking English so they meet International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards. If the HN Air Force wishes to spend less money in the future on having tech manuals translated to their native language or if they want more opportunity to acquire aircraft systems, then their maintainers and logisticians must also speak English. However, it may not be in NATO's ability to provide all the maintainers and logisticians with English instruction if the HN can accomplish their mission by training only a few in English and having those individuals pass on required information to lower level personnel. Regardless, English language training must be a consideration for HN forces NATO wishes to engage with.

4.2.2.2 Language, Regional and Cultural Training for NATO Forces. It was recommended that a quick introduction to the cultures of the NATO forces represented and the HN would help facilitate cooperation between the groups. This is needed not only for the unit leadership, but for every member of the unit prior to arrival or as part of in processing. For example, the Rotary Wing squadron within NATC-A is comprised of US, Czech, Croatian and Hungarian personnel. These forces would relate better to other nations participating in the mission if they have a better understanding of the cultures with which they are operating. This will help mitigate the challenges associated with what is referred to as intercultural communication. There are a number of books available that discuss the skills required to present a message to a foreign culture in a relevant way. An example is 'Military Cross-

Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development' by Brian Selmeski of the US Air Force Culture and Language Center. These methods will improve the likelihood advisors will be effective at imparting knowledge despite cultural differences. Additionally, the leadership should work to build an environment where different cultures are celebrated, seen with equal parity, and ensure social events are part of the work schedule. English language standards for NATO forces supporting the mission must also be enforced. This will help improve cooperation and reduce misunderstandings between nations supporting the AvSFA operation.

4.2.2.3 Chain of Command. The existence of a confusing chain of command amongst the variety of national forces participating in current NATC-A operation was identified as an issue in NATC-A questionnaires. Currently, the NATO Tactical Control (TACON) relationship for the deploying teams to NATC-A is not properly codified and therefore any formal chain of command relationships cannot be enforced. This means if the forces of a participating nation choose to ignore the orders of someone appointed over them (for example, the squadron commander of a unit comprised of forces from many nations), there is currently no efficient means to enforce them aside from complaining to the local leadership from that nation. This makes it extremely difficult to enforce true standards within the unit. NATC-A has recently re-codified the chain of command in an updated organizational chart when disaggregation required a realignment of the NTM-A. Despite having seen vast improvements over the last year, command and control challenges are still an issue.³

4.2.2.4 National Caveats. A national caveat is a restriction placed on the use of national military contingents operating as part of a multinational operation.⁴ Because the levels of acceptable risk to meet the national goals of the participating nations are different, there is likelihood that national caveats across nations will also be different. These different national caveats will by definition constrain the missions that national forces can participate in. It was expressed in the questionnaires that imposition of the existing

national caveats is detrimental to overall mission accomplishment. Presently, each nation represented in NATC-A operates from a different set of national rules addressing missions they are unable to accomplish. Some of these limitations negatively impact NATC-A's ability to advise Afghans, both on operational and training missions. Examples of these caveats include no 'mixed cockpits on missions', i.e. only personnel from one nation permitted in an aircraft during operational missions, no training permitted beyond 50 km from Kabul, and no spending the night away from Kabul. This places an undue burden on the nations with less restrictive national caveats and results in an advisor/resource management challenge. Also, caveats sometimes put advisors in an embarrassing situation when they are unable to execute a mission that can be performed by other coalition partners. As was stated in the questionnaire, 'it is unpleasant if you "stand in front" of Afghan partners saying that you are not able to do it, but another nation can do it'. The problem of national caveats is not new and was identified as a problem during the Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in Kosovo in 1999. NATO leaders met in Copenhagen, Denmark in 2005 to address the matter of national caveats. They passed Resolution 336 on reducing national caveats, but the resolution was non-binding, meaning that nations could apply it as they deemed fit.⁵

4.2.2.5 Planning and Establishing Overall Mission Requirements and Objectives. Effective planning is essential in ensuring that the right types of capabilities are built with the most appropriate partners.⁶ There currently are no AvSFA specific Capability Codes (CC) or Capability Statements (CS) in the most current list of the Bi-SC Agreed Capability Codes and Statements. The CC/CS provide the common language used in defence and operational planning.⁷ Having educated and trained staff officers/planners to develop the concepts and aims of the planned capability is a crucial element in NATO's overall SFA concept. The concepts and aims of the planned capability will define AvSFA requirements. This will in turn be used to create accurate and achievable AvSFA CC/CS. This can ensure that personnel demands and equipment requirements are properly included in the NDPP. This



Commander of Afghanistan's Air University 'Pohantoon-e-Hayayee' presents a Mongolian Air Force instructor for the Mongolian Air Force Mentoring Team, with a gift of appreciation.

strategic/operational level planning can ensure tactical capability exists for a successful AvSFA program. Additionally, if participating NATO nations have conflicting objectives it can result in general confusion and unwillingness to come to an agreement on training standards and methods. NATO must establish the common goals of the mission at the strategic/operational level when preparing to engage with partner nations and the objectives must then be agreed to by the partner. Having educated and trained staff officers/planners contribute to and participate in this process is critical.

4.2.2.6 Common Qualification Standards. The application of a common qualification standard across nations that have different approaches to operations, training and currency was mentioned as a concern in NATC-A operations. What one nation may define as a basic level of operational competence may be identified as an Instructor Pilot (IP) for other countries. This issue is one that affects the NATO helicopter community in general⁸ and affects the AvSFA mission in Afghanistan specifically. Currently, if a participating nation declares an individual current and qualified in

air assault, NVG, etc. unless directly measured against objective criteria, it is merely an opinion. This means requirements must be defined as clearly as possible and agreed to at the operational level. Also, pilot qualifications and currency records should be standardized to the maximum extent possible. A tool in reaching the goal of having a more common qualification standard may be for NATO to increase funding to the Multinational Helicopter Initiative (MHI) project so that countries with air and ground crews that lack the required qualifications or currency can get them trained based on a more clearly defined and standardized requirement. There are a number of companies that provide comprehensive ground and flight crew training services in support of current requirements. This training could be funded by NATO in return for a commitment to provide some reasonable level of operational support (e.g. a 6 month deployment). NATO is currently working to address some of these standardization issues through the development of ATP-90 'Minimum Core Competence Levels and Proficiency of Skills for NATO Land Operations'. This document seeks to clarify the minimum training requirement to provide certain tactical capabilities.

4.3 NATO AvSFA Doctrine

4.3.1 This study determined there are a number of official NATO and national documents that provide doctrine, guidance and TTP on SFA. Unfortunately, there are few that specifically address the unique challenges associated with the AvSFA mission. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.4, Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) has a section that discusses the 'Air Component Contribution' to COIN operations. It states that 'air contributions include close air support, precision strike, air interdiction, airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, communication, combat support, and air mobility. Air efforts in coordination with space forces and capabilities can provide considerable asymmetric advantages to counter insurgents'.⁹ Unfortunately, the focus is mostly on kinetic capabilities and does not discuss the strategic effects the non-kinetic aspects of Air Power can have on success in COIN operations. AJP 3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations mentions 'Peacetime Military Engagements' and 'Peace Support Operations' and the role Military Assistance (MA) plays in

them.¹⁰ MA is defined as 'a broad spectrum of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations'¹¹. AvSFA is viewed by NATO as a subset of MA.¹² Unfortunately, it does not provide details on the role Special Operations or GPF forces tasked to support the MA mission play in these operations. It is expected that this issue will be addressed as part of the ACT-sponsored SFA Conceptual Study.

4.3.2 Only one NATO nation has a variety of documents that provide doctrine, guidance and TTP regarding the conduct of AvSFA. These documents come from the US Joint Community, and the USAF. These documents include the Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, 'Irregular Warfare', Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare, Version 2.0, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3-22, 'Foreign Internal Defense', and Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (AFTTP) Document 3-4.5, 'Air Advising'. AFDD 2-3 'focuses on the operational and strategic aspects of irregular warfare and differences in the application

Members of the Afghan Air Force, along with advisors from NATC-A listen to speeches and discuss future goals during the first annual AAF Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation Conference.



of force from traditional warfare and describes Air Force capabilities and operations required to effectively defend and counter adversaries¹³. AFDD 3-22 provides ‘an Air Force perspective on FID operations and discusses the broad, enduring beliefs about the best way to employ airpower in FID operations’¹⁴. The purpose of the AFTTP is to ‘provide US Air Force general purpose advisors with a tactical doctrine document that contains TTP on how to assist partner nation air forces build, sustain, and implement Air Power capacities and build their aviation enterprise in support of national policies’¹⁵.

4.3.3 Role of SOF in NATO AvSFA Operations. Within the NSHQ Special Air Warfare Manual dated March 2012, it states that ‘Special air warfare forces conduct special operations in order to accomplish the principal tasks assigned to NATO SOF’¹⁶. Listed among those principal tasks is MA. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces; engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations; and civil-military actions supporting and influencing the local population. The range of MA is thus considerable and may vary from providing low-level military training or material assistance to the active employment of indigenous forces in the conduct of major operations. MA activities may include training and advising host nation military units and individuals. Just as with land and maritime MA, air/aviation MA by SOF is characterized by a higher level of political or physical risk than would be acceptable by conventional air/aviation forces.¹⁷ Since AvSFA is considered a subset of MA, NATO SOF personnel should provide considerable input in the development of the NATO AvSFA capability.

4.3.4 The NSHQ Special Air Warfare Manual dated March 2012 states that MA tasks for NATO special air warfare forces include assessing, training, advising, and assisting indigenous air/aviation forces in the employment and sustainment of their air/aviation capabilities. The difference between air/aviation MA conducted by special air warfare forces from those conducted by conventional forces is the environment where the MA is provided. This is significant because the NSHQ Special Air Warfare Manual recognizes that

the AvSFA mission can be accomplished in at least some capacity by NATO GPF. The NSHQ states that ‘the trend in GPF approaches in recent history has involved employment of large, ad-hoc groups of expeditionary forces that are only recently familiar, not only with the MA mission but, also with the aircraft and equipment of the target nation. In assessing, training and advising, GPF tend to target training each individual indigenous crewman. Also, GPF often make appropriate considerations to developing indigenous force organization and infrastructure including aviation maintenance, flight line security, etc., which could manifest benefit for the next generation. The SOF approach, in theory, employs a relatively smaller team of culturally astute Subject Matter Experts (SME) and focuses on selecting and training the indigenous trainers and leaders who would bear the larger responsibility of training their own countrymen. Using this approach, SOF can often rapidly generate indigenous capabilities in a short period for near term employment’¹⁸.

4.3.5 The NSHQ is working to promote standardized doctrine and training, and ‘the possible development of an interim NATO SF operational flying capability’. Lt Gen Frank Kisner, the former commander of the NSHQ believes that ‘the overarching strategy envisaged from the NSHQ perspective involves a coherent framework for NATO SF aviation development that facilitates an end state of synchronized, integrated and mutually supporting SF aviation capacity across the alliance’¹⁹. Unfortunately, this flight detachment implementation has been delayed due to budgetary restrictions. The NSHQ may, in the interim, be able to offer advisory staff assistance to GPF with the handful of SME assigned, if directed.²⁰ Once this capability is fully manned, organized and equipped, it would be a critical element in the development of an overarching, standardized NATO AvSFA capability.

4.4 NATO AvSFA Capacity

4.4.1 An inadequate inventory of SOF air assets and capabilities currently exists within NATO and NATO nations. Because of that, the nearer term goals for air-focused MA are internal to NATO. That is, NATO nations must concentrate on helping one another build the

SOF aviation targets that resulted from NDPP requirements. This means another method of meeting at least the near term AvSFA requirement must be met using non-SOF personnel. According to the NSHQ, 'Just as with land and maritime MA, Air/Avn MA by SOF is characterized by a higher level of political or physical risk than would be acceptable by conventional air/aviation forces.²¹ The use of GPF to provide this capability is currently how the NATC-A mission is being accomplished. *For other NATO-led MA missions, NATO SOF personnel may provide leadership and expertise with GPF providing supporting personnel. If GPF are used, specific, unique skills are needed for them to be successful. These include but are not limited to language training, regional and cultural familiarization, the ability to fly, maintain, and employ foreign aircraft in combat situations, and personal force protection skills.*²²

4.4.2 The ideal solution to providing NATO with AvSFA capability is to create specially trained and resourced organizations dedicated specifically to this mission. Dedicated AvSFA organizations would be capable of accomplishing this mission much more professionally and competently than units that aren't specifically organized, trained, and equipped for this unique mission. By building an organization focused on AvSFA, NATO would be much more capable of building a targeted partner's security capacity and capability. Although there are clear advantages to having a dedicated organization, it may not be feasible with the fiscal constraints found in most NATO countries today. Fortunately, there are alternatives to creating new organizations. These options include the use of contractors and/or assigning AvSFA duties as a collateral mission to currently existing NATO units. Reputable defence contractors, in a supporting role under the direct authority of NATO officers, have proven capable of performing the AvSFA mission. The French Air Force uses a quasi-private entity that hires retired air force officers to conduct some of its training of partner air force personnel.²³ However, this option may also pose significant financial challenges.

4.4.3 A less expensive option may be to assign the AvSFA mission as a collateral mission to existing NATO units. Existing NATO military personnel could receive

specialized training which would build on experience they already possess. This approach can be accomplished by training either some or all of the personnel within a unit specially designated to support the NATO AvSFA mission. The number of personnel trained within a nation's existing force structure would be based on the level of commitment a nation could be or are willing to provide. For example, *a select number of personnel* (air crew, maintainers, air traffic controllers, etc) within an already existing Hungarian (or French, Czech, etc) rotary wing unit could be specifically trained to provide an AvSFA capability for NATO. These personnel could be attached with other personnel from different countries that together provide the total desired capability. This approach takes advantage of pre-existing supporting infrastructure and human capital that already possesses many of the skills needed to be successful in this mission. Another method could have *all the personnel* within (for example) an existing light fixed wing airlift squadron in Spain (or Belgium, Germany, etc) receive AvSFA specific training in addition to their baseline air crew training. These units could operate on their own or in conjunction with other NATO AvSFA-capable units to provide the desired effect. Either of the methods mentioned above would create an available cadre of AvSFA advisors across NATO but would not require the creation of new units to provide it.

4.4.4 Because Rotary Wing and Fixed Wing light airlift can be especially valuable during national crises such as natural disasters or other humanitarian emergencies, it can be a key component of a partner nation's aviation enterprise. It therefore, becomes a natural focus for AvSFA missions. It provides the ability to more rapidly transport personnel, equipment, government forces, fuel, and supplies within the partner nation's territory than other forms of transport. Airlift offers partner nation leaders a degree of speed, range, and flexibility not available with any other mode of transportation. This can make it an important instrument of government policy and an essential element of national capability and legitimacy. Using light airlift as the AvSFA foundation, NATO personnel would advise and assist partner nations in establishing and/or further developing these basic airlift operations:

- passenger and cargo movement;
- medical airlift;
- disaster relief/humanitarian assistance;
- personnel recovery.²⁴

This means any NATO nation with an existing light airlift capability can provide an AvSFA capability if the personnel designated to support the mission receive the training mentioned paragraph 4.4.1. This is important because at the 2006 NATO Summit in Riga, NATO introduced a 'SOF Transformation Initiative' that sought to address identified shortfalls in NATO's SOF capabilities to accomplish current and future requirements.²⁵ *Nations that seek to provide this capability for NATO could leverage existing light fixed wing or rotary wing airlift experience. With additional specialized training (and little to no hardware investment) they can then provide a significant AvSFA capability for NATO, thereby addressing some of the shortfalls identified in the Riga Summit. This specialized training could be provided by a number of organizations that presently exist within NATO.*

4.4.5 There is an identified difficulty in training and retaining this AvSFA skill set in NATO. Training in this area will require significant time for language and cultural training as well as country specific aircraft training and training development skills. A dedicated workforce (military or otherwise) would need lengthy tour commitments to succeed. Unfortunately, typical AvSFA rotation schedules prohibit this type of employment since the cycle generally lasts more than 3 years. The recurring training requirements for NATO AvSFA units could be reduced by establishing a NATO program similar to the US's State Partnership Program (SPP). The SPP is executed through the US National Guard Bureau, fostering enduring relationships with over 60 participating HNs, and plays a significant role in supporting Combatant Command (COCOM) Theatre Campaign Plan and Security Cooperation initiatives. Nearly every US state is affiliated with at least one HN for primary contact.²⁶ Because NATO AvSFA units in this program would be dedicated to fostering an enduring relationship with a single nation, the unit could tailor their training relative to this nation. It would also improve the

credibility of the NATO unit and the HN as they would have a continuing, long term relationship built on previous successes.

4.5 NATO AvSFA Training

4.5.1 AvSFA Centre of Excellence (COE)

This study determined there are a number of NATO entities that currently provide AvSFA training to NATO forces. These entities could serve as a foundation for providing standardized AvSFA training and education across the NATO enterprise. In order to facilitate development of this capability, ACT should advocate for creating an AvSFA (or generic SFA) COE. COEs are nationally or multinationally funded institutions that train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO member and partner countries, assist in doctrine development, identify lessons learned, improve interoperability, and capabilities and test and validate concepts through experimentation. They offer recognized experience and expertise that is beneficial to NATO and support the transformation of NATO, while avoiding the duplication of assets, resources and capabilities already present within the NATO command structure.²⁷ This organization could leverage the existing AvSFA training capabilities at any one of the existing training locations mentioned in this chapter as the foundation for this COE organization.

4.5.2 USAF Air Advisor Academy (AAA)

The USAF stood up the AAA in 2012 based on a demand for GPF air advisors. That demand led the USAF Chief of Staff to direct the building of a permanent pre-deployment training detachment.²⁸ The AAA has the capacity to train up to 1,500 personnel annually. The AAA also has the ability to generate mobile training teams that can provide training to locations around the globe.²⁹ The goal of the AAA is to teach 'air minded' professionals methods to effectively, legally, and safely use their specific skills and experience with their HN counterparts and prepare them for the environment they are expected to operate in. They seek to combine core Air Advisor skills with language, region, and cultural instruction, and advanced fieldcraft skills

to Airmen of all ranks and positions, across all Major Commands.³⁰ Examples of fieldcraft skills taught at the academy include high-threat driving, active shooter/insider threats, advanced weapons, self-protection, small-team tactics, convoy operations, and training in countering improvised explosive devices.³¹ NATC-A views the five-week Air Advisor Academy training course as pivotal in preparing Air Advisors to meet mission demands.³²

4.5.3 Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center (AFSOAWC)

The AFSOAWC is the USAF Special Operations Command's central organization for education, training, test, doctrine, and advising. Among other missions, units within the AFSOAWC provide Combat Aviation Advisors (CAAs) to Theatre Special Operations Commands for advising missions. The Center operates a Combat Air Advisor Mission Qualification Course (CAAMQC) which includes language training, land navigation, force protection, regional studies, financial concerns, and survival training for CAAs. The Center also trains Non-Standard Aviation operators, SOF Medics, CAA augmenters and other AFSOC personnel deploying to sensitive, austere environments.³³

4.5.4 NATO Special Operations HQ (NSHQ)

The NSHQ is the primary point of development, coordination and direction for all NATO Special Operations-related activities, in order to optimize employment of SOF and provide an operational command capability when directed by Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). The NSHQ Commander's Intent is to provide NATO and NSHQ Allies and Partners with expert SOF advice, information, training, education, networking and operational support and be prepared to be part of a SOF Command and Control (C2) deployable core. Additionally, they seek to engage routinely with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), other NATO entities, and our Nations, acting with unity of purpose on behalf of NSHQ and enable national and combined NATO SOF capabilities, which are increasingly relevant in today's uncertain and dynamic world.³⁴ The NSHQ is

in a unique position to offer specialized training and advisory staff assistance to NATO SOF or GPF advisors in a dedicated facility.³⁵

4.5.5 Multinational Aviation Training Centre (MATC)

4.5.5.1 The Czech Republic conceived an initiative to build a Multinational Aviation Training Centre, which aims to streamline the system of preparation and training of aviation personnel (helicopter pilots and maintenance specialists) of the participating countries assigned to advisory teams in the NTM-A.³⁶ The MATC currently seeks to provide comprehensive training of aircrew and maintenance personnel on Mi-type helicopters, with maximum use of existing capabilities and structures while minimizing the overall costs. It will consider the possibility of supporting other helicopters or fixed wing aircraft in the future if it is determined the requirement exists.³⁷ A Letter of Intent (LOI) to work together towards the establishment of the MATC was signed on 21 February 2013 by Croatia, Czech Republic, Slovakia and USA. Hungary also formally joined this initiative on 20 September 2013.³⁸ The Czech Republic-led MATC has been designated a Tier 1 NATO Smart Defence Project.³⁹ The Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the MATC is expected around 2015 and Full Operational Capability (FOC) should be achieved about two years later.⁴⁰ Focus areas include multinational logistics, operational doctrine, education, mutual recognition of airworthiness rules, and other possible areas of collaboration.⁴¹ The MATC further seeks to increase interoperability of Rotary Wing aviation in support of AvSFA requirements, assist in the development of AvSFA doctrine and training, and capitalize on the Smart Defence initiative to reduce redundancies, increase efficiency and reduce national financial and personnel expenditures. It will do this by standardizing education and training, improving technical and tactical standards, and improving the common deployment capability of helicopter crews as well as of ground maintenance experts.⁴²

4.5.5.2 The MATC is currently funded by the Multinational Helicopter Initiative (MHI). Created in February 2009, the MHI is responsible for the development of a multinational transport helicopter programme for



US Air Force Airmen train South Vietnam pilots, Bien Hoa Air Base, 1961.

NATO to help those countries that do not have the resources to deploy and run a transport helicopter operation on their own. This multinational initiative will facilitate the in-theatre deployment of transport helicopters by NATO and Partner nations through the collective support of other Allies. Assistance ranges from the provision of operational pre-deployment training; command and control capabilities; base support or financial aid. The initiative was signed by the Czech Republic, Albania, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey and the UK and provided the necessary political mandate to start mitigating critical utility helicopter shortfalls, particularly in the conduct of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan.⁴³

4.6 NATO AvSFA Personnel

4.6.1 The AvSFA mission requires personnel that possess unique training and experience. These personnel must also possess a proactive attitude and a tolerance of possible harsh living conditions and austere environments working with foreign forces. Because advisors must rely on personal relationships to achieve assigned objectives, years of education, training, and experience are helpful in bridging social and operational divides. Cultural sensitivity, political awareness,

and language skills are required to build these enduring relationships.⁴⁴ Air Advisors must also have respect for foreign culture, a deep appreciation of political realities, and superior personal communication skills.

4.6.2 As the personnel supporting the AvSFA mission are unique, so are the units. Advisory units should be configured as multidisciplinary teams to mitigate risks associated with augmentation. Cross-functional capabilities are required for team safety as well as theatre tasking. Every advisory operation relies on organic support from maintenance crew chiefs, force protection specialists, intelligence and communications personnel, and survival, escape and evasion experts. It is extremely unwise for deployed detachments to rely on unfamiliar personnel for critical functions during high-risk operations. Required familiarity should be sourced from standing teams with shared education, training, and operational experiences.⁴⁵ This means an enduring, regionally focused AvSFA capability that promotes continuity is important in enabling the success of NATO AvSFA missions.

4.6.3 This is not to say that NATO units and personnel must be exclusively dedicated to the AvSFA mission. The current fiscal challenges may make this unrealistic. *A more pragmatic approach would be to develop the*

capability out of existing force structure. This can be done by designating an existing NATO Rotary or Fixed Wing light airlift unit for AvSFA duty as a collateral mission in addition to their existing duty requirements. NATO has a large number of nations to draw from to tailor the capability to meet the specific requirement.

4.7 Conclusions

The following are the key findings that must be addressed in order to provide a viable NATO AvSFA capability. Although there are advantages to using an alliance to support this mission, there are a number of issues that must be addressed. These include ensuring all air advisors have a basic qualification standard to include level of English language skill, and regional and cultural training. They must have a properly codified chain of command prior to deployment and national caveats must be minimized. Also, the training and qualification levels for NATO Air advisors should be standardized. The AvSFA mission is not represented in the NDPP process and there is a lack of NATO specific doctrine and TTP. NATO staff must capture mission requirements in the NDPP process and develop doctrine and TTP that addresses not only mission accomplishment but also the unique challenges of multinational AvSFA operations. NATO is currently undergoing a restructuring of its SOF forces that has identified a shortfall in SOF aviation capability. This means NATO must develop a plan to use GPF at least in the short term to provide most of the mission requirements. There are a number of AvSFA training efforts that should at a minimum, be coordinated and standardized. The recommendations in the following chapter offer options to address the issues identified in this study.

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5. Ibid.
6. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Gons, et al., International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, (RAND 2009), 11.
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10. NATO, Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.5, Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, (Jan. 2009), 1–2.
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14. USAF, Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 3–22, Foreign Internal Defense, (1 Nov. 2011), vi.
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21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Kim Cragin, Eric Gons, et al., International Cooperation with Partner Air Forces, (RAND 2009), 114.
24. USAF, USAF Air Advising Concept, (3 Feb. 2012), p. 38.
25. NATO, NATO SOF Transformation Initiative [electronic presentation], (28 Feb. 2008).
26. US European Command, National Guard State Partnership Program, <http://www.eucom.mil/key-activities/partnership-programs/national-guard-state-partnership-program>
27. NATO, Centres of Excellence, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68372.htm
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29. Ibid. 6.
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31. Maj Gen, Timothy M. Zadalis, USA, The Air Advisor – The Face of US Air Force Engagement, USAF Air & Space Power Journal, (Jul.–Aug. 2013), 4–13.
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37. Ibid. 5.
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39. In a speech by US Ambassador to the Czech Republic at MATC Conference, Ostrava, CZE, 20 Sep. 2103, it was stated the of 23 NATO Smart Defence Projects, only 8 have been designated as Tier 1.
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42. MATC Multinational Project Team, MATC Concept, (28 Feb. 2013), 5.
43. NATO, Allies Sign Declaration of Intent for HIP Helicopter Initiative, (23 Oct. 2009), http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_58509.htm
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45. Ibid.



USAF Advisor speaks with AAF maintenance commanders, during routine Mi-17 inspections at Kabul International Airport, Afghanistan.

CHAPTER V

Recommendations

'Partnership is not a choice between staying at home or going global. It is not peripheral to our business – it is a part of NATO's core business. In almost all areas, we need effective partnership to be successful. To manage crisis. To defend against emerging security challenges. And to promote stability.'

NATO General Secretary,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen

This chapter will introduce solutions and identify actions to guide NATO on how to mitigate the identified gaps supporting the current air advisor mission and for delivering this capability for future NATO-led Air Advisor missions. It also proposes a training methodology for NATO Air Advisors in order to instruct supporting

nations with standards to provide a uniformly trained airman to execute AED based on unique operational requirements. This chapter is organized using the DOTMLPFI¹ format.

5.1 Doctrine

Development of both standardized NATO AvSFA doctrine and TTP should supplement the work being done by ACT to generate NATO specific SFA doctrine. Input regarding unique AvSFA doctrine requirements must either be captured in the generic SFA doctrine or as is done by the USAF, unique AvSFA doctrine must be developed and promulgated. As the primary point of development and coordination for NATO SOF, NSHQ should play a lead role in doctrine and TTP development for all NATO AvSFA operations. This effort should leverage the US AvSFA doctrine and TTP as it applies to NATO operations.

5.2 Organization

5.2.1 Staff offices focused on harmonizing SFA efforts across NATO diplomatic, economic and military spheres should be created within the NATO International Staff (IS) and NATO International Military Staff (IMS). Although it may be considered outside the scope of this aviation focused study, a coherent engagement strategy across the political, economic and military departments is a crucial element in ensuring the effective and efficient use of this AvSFA capability. These offices would be critical in developing this coherent strategy.

5.2.2 NATO should create AvSFA units by providing personnel assigned to existing light fixed wing airlift and helicopter units with additional specialized AvSFA training as described in paragraph 4.4.1. Before any training commences, a determination should be made as to which NATO unit/personnel could best fulfil that unique requirement and be specifically trained as advisors for that particular area/mission. Once a unit is designated for AvSFA duty, it should be assigned to a specific country or region of focus with the intent of continuing AvSFA relationships into the long term. If a unit is given an additional AvSFA duty tied to a given region, a determination must be made as to how much of the unit will be allowed to conduct this additional duty at any one time, how much time will be allotted for the training of this additional duty and what is the required lead time prior to mission employment. These questions must be addressed and agreed to by both the force provider and requesting agency. SOF personnel may provide leadership and expertise for these units with GPF providing supporting personnel.

5.3 Training

5.3.1 NATO should seek to professionalize the AvSFA capability across NATO. This is done by adopting a 'partnering' culture and standardizing the skill set required to support the capability. NATO should consider using a tiered approach in providing training to those that support AvSFA. These tiers should consist of three levels. The first level is for personnel that are tasked

with a single mission in a permissive environment². The training these personnel receive will be as required to familiarize them with the area of operations and basic SFA fundamentals. The second level will be for personnel that perform SFA periodically in areas where the operational environment is less than permissive. These personnel will receive more training to include in depth force protection training. The third level will be for those that perform SFA missions frequently³ in areas that may be hostile⁴. These personnel will receive extensive SFA training as required to meet specific mission objectives. Within the third level, if SOF are specifically required for the mission then the training requirement must take this into consideration.

5.3.2 In order to reduce the number of disparate training efforts across NATO, relevant NATO organizations such as the NATO HQ – International Staff Operations Division Training Coordination Activities and Aviation should contact national organizations such as the USAF's Headquarters, Irregular Warfare Directorate (AF/A3O-Q), Air Education and Training Command's Special Mission Division (AETC/A3Q) and the AAA to look for ways to share ideas and training experiences. Both NATO and national training efforts will benefit from such an exchange. The goal would be to provide all Air Advisors across NATO with the best possible education and training, institutionalize the preparation of airmen for training and advisory assignments, foster standardization and harmonize AvSFA training requirements across NATO.

5.3.3 In order to facilitate development of this capability, ACT should advocate for creating an AvSFA (or generic SFA) COE. The MATC could serve as the foundation of this COE for NATO using the AAA syllabus as a training template. Mobile training teams from the AAA or AFISOAWC could augment and improve the overall training syllabus and help to standardize the training AvSFA Advisors receive prior to prosecuting a mission. As the primary point of development and coordination for NATO SOF, NSHQ should provide input on mission requirements to the International Staff Operations Division, Training Coordination Activities and Aviation office and should maintain oversight of the training program.

5.3.4 The English skills of NATO personnel supporting the AvSFA mission must be excellent. Those supporting the mission should have courses available to improve their English language skills if needed, preferably online to mitigate costs or by using existing bilateral military training agreements. Additionally, professional courses on the topic of international rules and procedures must be available to AvSFA professionals so they may ably train the host nations in these rules and procedures. The MATC should begin development of these capabilities once it is suitably resourced.

5.4 Material

Additional material requirements to support this mission area can vary based on NATO's desired course of action regarding the recommendations in this study. For example, if NATO chooses to stand up discrete AvSFA units, the material requirements will be higher than if NATO opts to leverage existing units by

providing them with relevant training to support mission requirements. Thus, specific material recommendations are beyond the scope of this study.

5.5 Leadership/Personnel

Having educated and trained staff officers/planners develop the concepts and aims of AvSFA missions are a crucial element in NATO's overall SFA concept. NATO must identify those officers that have AvSFA experience and ensure they are assigned to the proper staff positions. This strategic/operational level planning can then drive the tactical capability needs which can ensure the personnel demands and equipment requirements are properly considered in the development of AvSFA CC and CS. This, in turn, can be used to drive the NDPP which will facilitate development of a relevant, capable and suitable AvSFA force structure. These trained staff officers should be assigned as part of all relevant NATO staff elements to provide NATO

Italian Air Force service members with NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan/838th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group have a meeting with AAF members in Shindand, Afghanistan.





South Vietnamese pilots learn from an American instructor.

and NSHQ Allies and Partners with expert SOF advice, information, training, education, networking and operational support to include influencing the NDPP.

5.6 Facilities

As with the material requirements, additional facility requirements to support this mission area can vary. For example, if NATO chooses to leverage existing units to support mission requirements, existing facilities can be used. Thus, facility requirements will be mission based and are beyond the scope of this study.

5.7 Interoperability

5.7.1 Development of standardized NATO doctrine and TTP will help to mitigate tactical level interoperability issues between NATO AvSFA units. As the primary point of development and coordination for NATO SOF, the NSHQ is uniquely situated to help develop TTP in accordance with lessons learned on operational missions to aid in NATO interoperability and effectiveness. With these in place, any tactical

level interoperability issues can be adjudicated by the NSHQ staff using established and promulgated doctrine and TTP. Additionally, there are other elements of interoperability and TTP that must be addressed prior to developing an engagement strategy with potential HNs. It must be ensured that NATO TTP/standards employed for a particular mission (for example, air-drop, air assault, personnel recovery, etc) are releasable to partnered nations to ensure sensitive information is not compromised.

5.7.2 National caveats can be a major strategic level interoperability issue in NATO SFA missions. Because the national goals of the participating nations are different, there is a likelihood that national caveats will continue to exist in future operations. These national caveats will constrain the missions in which forces can participate. If AvSFA missions and tasks are clearly defined prior to deployment, restrictive caveats would be minimized. The offices in the IS and IMS (recommended in the 'Organization' section of this chapter) should be responsible for clearly defining these missions and tasks prior to mission execution. Additionally,

national caveats must be compared against mission requirements prior to accepting a supporting nation's participation. Although it is unrealistic to believe national caveats can be eliminated, participating nations must be aware of the impacts these have and make every effort to reduce them so commanders of AvSFA missions are not forced to deal with them at the tactical level.

5.7.3 As mentioned in the previous chapter, a confusing chain of command was a significant issue for NATC-A. Currently, the NATO TACON relationship for the teams deploying to NATC-A is not codified and therefore, cannot be enforced. Volunteering nations must be willing to relinquish national TACON and recognize the NATO assigned chain of command prior to bidding for Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) positions. Additionally, the Transfer of Authority (TOA) must be clear prior to mission execution to reduce multinational command challenges. There is an essential interdependence between responsibility and authority. The responsibility assigned to any NATO commander must be matched with the delegation of authority by nations and NATO to allow the adequate discharge of responsibilities. The NATO

commander at the appropriate level must be given sufficient authority over the available resources to enable him to receive, employ, sustain and redeploy forces assigned to him by nations in the most effective manner. The same should apply for non-NATO commanders of multinational forces participating in a NATO-led operation.⁵

5.7.4 Regarding the lack of common qualification standard across nations, AvSFA personnel qualifications and requirements must be defined as clearly as possible and agreed to at the strategic level and pilot qualifications and currency records should be standardized to the maximum extent possible. An option to reach this goal is for NATO to increase funding to the MHI project mentioned in the previous chapter so that countries with air and ground crews lacking the required qualifications or currency can get trained to the agreed standards.

1. Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability.

2. As defined by an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control.

3. As defined as more than once per year for longer than two weeks duration.

4. As defined by an area where hostile forces have the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct.

5. NATO, Logistics-Principles, Policies and Planning, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_61741.htm

CHAPTER VI

Conclusions

SFA has been and will be an important component of NATO's overall strategic approach. The AvSFA mission must be a major component of NATO's overall SFA strategy and should be used in combination with other NATO SFA efforts. NATO must use the lessons from previous SFA operations to build a team of available SFA expertise it can use when the requirement is needed. NATO's goal must be to build a comprehensive and coherent AvSFA capability that is supported not only through the NDPP process but by involved leadership and sound guidance.

NATO must develop AvSFA doctrine and TTP that provides NATO air advisors with comprehensive guidance that is applicable to all areas where they may operate. NATO can choose to use the relevant documents from member nations that have experience in the mission as a reference for this guidance. Most importantly though, once this doctrinal foundation is developed NATO's distinctive mission requirements and unique challenges must be addressed to increase the likelihood of future AvSFA mission success.

Although NATO has an AvSFA capability as evidenced by support for the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, it is currently done ad hoc. This leads to problems which could be lessened by adopting the potential solutions and essential actions identified in the previous chapter. There are many organizational structures and processes within NATO that could effectively provide the required capabilities and address those problems. According to the NSHQ, there is an identified gap between the NATO's current Air Advisor capability and the current and anticipated requirement. Specifically, an inadequate inventory of SOF air assets and capabilities currently exists within NATO and the NATO nations. Given the financial challenges NATO is experiencing, NATO is

unlikely to support creation of new AvSFA units from scratch. The option most likely to gain support is to establish a specially trained and resourced organization that leverages the current skills and experience of a NATO GPF unit, led by NATO SOF personnel.

This organization must receive standardized training managed by a group that maintains oversight of a formalized AvSFA training syllabus. The training should be tiered according to the requirement so time is not spent on unneeded training and training costs can be minimized. The training can be accomplished at a number of locations within NATO but one office within NATO must be responsible for maintaining standardization within the mission area. By using this training model, Air Advisors will be able to instruct supporting nations with standards to execute AvSFA based on NATO's unique operational requirements.

NATO must ensure that it has staff organizations in place that can address unique AvSFA mission requirements. These include development and advancement of policy and doctrine, coordination of AvSFA efforts with other SFA efforts, coordination and management of the defence planning process in support of AvSFA requirements and development of TTP based on the lessons of previous AvSFA operations. NATO leadership must develop a staff structure that understands the mission and properly advocates for it in the NDPP process and helps foster interoperability using standardized doctrine and TTP.

Based on the fact that NATO is currently engaged with 41 countries as partners and the strong emphasis the current NATO strategic concept places on partnership building, the anticipated future AvSFA mission requirement is expected to remain high. By following the recommendations in this document, NATO can develop a generic and comprehensive concept for NATO contributions in developing a host nation's aviation enterprise and their supporting institutions.

ANNEX A

Acronyms

AAA	Air Advisor Academy	DOTMLPFI	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability
AAF	Afghan Air Force	FID	Foreign Internal Defence
ACO	Allied Command Operations	FM	Field Manual
ACT	Allied Command Transformation	FOC	Full Operational Capability
AED	Aviation Enterprise Development	GI	Group of Interest
AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document	GPF	General Purpose Forces
AFSOAWC	Air Force Special Operations Air Warfare Center	HN	Host Nations
AJP	Allied Joint Publication	ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
AvSFA	Aviation Security Force Assistance	IOC	Initial Operational Capability
Bi-SC	Bi-Strategic Command (ACO & ACT)	IP	Instructor Pilot
CAA	Combat Aviation Advisors	ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
CC	Capability Codes	IMS	International Military Staff
COCOM	Combatant Command	ICI	Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
CS	Capability Statements	IS	International Staff
CD&E	Concept Development and Experimentation	JAPCC	Joint Air Power Competence Centre
CJSOR	Combined Joint Statement of Requirements	JCISFA	Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance
COE	Centre of Excellence	JDN	Joint Doctrine Note
COIN	Counterinsurgency	KFOR	Kosovo Force
		LOI	Letter of Intent

MA	Military Assistance	RAF	Royal Air Force (UK)
MATC	Multinational Aviation Training Centre	RfS	Request for Support
MD	Mediterranean Dialogue	SACEUR	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
MHI	Multinational Helicopter Initiative	SFA	Security Force Assistance
NAC	North Atlantic Council	SHAPE	Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe
NATC-A	NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan	SME	Subject Matter Expert
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	SPP	State Partnership Program
NDPP	NATO Defence Planning Process	SOF	Special Operations Forces
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	SOS	Special Operations Squadron
NSHQ	NATO Special Operations Headquarters	TACON	Tactical Control
NTM-A	NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan	TOA	Transfer of Authority
NTM-I	NATO Training Mission – Iraq	TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
OUP	Operation Unified Protector	UAE	United Arab Emirates
PFP	Partnership for Peace	USAF	United States Air Force



Joint Air Power Competence Centre

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