Missile Defence in NATO

Towards a Coherent and Effective Surface Based Air and Missile Defence (SBAMD) as a Key Pillar of NATO ­Integrated Air and Missile Defence System

By Lieutenant General (ret.)

By Lt Gen

 Frederik H.

 Meulman

, NE

 AF

Royal Netherlands Air Force

Published:
 October 2017
 in 

Widening the Focus

For more than five years, NATO BMD has been high on NATO’s list of priorities1. NATO Heads of State and Government (HOS / G) have unanimously recognized that the proliferation of ballistic missiles poses an increasing threat to Allied populations, territory and deployed forces. Consequently, at the 2010 Lisbon Conference, NATO nations ­decided to expand upon the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme, started in 2004. To date, NATO has achieved a BMD Initial Operational Capability that offers a more mature and more effective capability to defend populations, territory and forces across southern NATO Europe against a ballistic missile attack. The next steps planned are the declaration of operational capability of the Aegis Ashore site in Poland in 2018 (as part of the US EPAA), and reaching a full operational NATO BMD capability as a next milestone including incorporating existing capabilities with future voluntary contributions offered by Allies.

Despite making these important steps forward in one of NATO’s key ­deterrence and defence capabilities, the scope of it appears to be too ­limited. The following reasons are considered as relevant. First, the ­geographical area covered by NATO’s BMD mission and the available ­capabilities will be limited to the defence of populations, territory and forces across southern Europe and will provide only a limited capability to defend NATO’s deployed forces. Many more and diverse exo- and endo-atmospheric BMD and Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) resources are required to provide the full coverage and protection of NATO’s entire European territory2. Second, (T)BMD is, while essential and integral, only part of the broader perspective of Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD)3 system. (T)BMD functions within the larger IAMD-domain. Third, the rebalanced security paradigm in Europe forces NATO to face the facts: deterrence and collective defence are once again in the political and ­military spotlight of NATO member states, which calls for a credible and effective NATO-wide posture of deterrence and collective defence, hence the renewed importance of Article V of the Washington Treaty.

NATO has clearly expressed this last in the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué: ‘The changed and evolving security environment demands the ability to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our ­territory and populations against attack, as set out in the Washington ­Treaty. And so renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defence.’ This declaration makes it clear that in order to meet this political and military strategic goal the current, limited focus on (T)BMD must be expanded to the broader domain of Joint Air Power. In the context of this document, this means incorporating the full spectrum of SBAMD roles and tasks as a dedicated part of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS).

What is needed now is a credible response in the domain of NATO Joint Air Power so that NATO has the capabilities and competencies to meet the air and missile challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction. This requirement is substantiated by the following concerns: first, with regard to TBMD, Russia’s recent engagements toward fulfilling expansionist self-determination as part of their international security policy in Georgia, in the Eastern part of the Ukraine and occupying the Crimea Peninsula, and in Syria; their ambivalent attitude toward the Baltic States; their recent deployment of Iskander missiles into the Kaliningrad Oblast; and the on­going modernization of its armed forces4. Second, with regard to BMD, the perceived missile threat from west Asia against southern NATO Europe. Third, with regard to (T)BMD, the instability along the periphery of ­southern NATO member states. Fourth, with regard to TBMD, the majority of NATO-led operations in the last few decades demonstrate the exe­cution of only a fraction of the possible roles and tasks that are part of the IAMD spectrum of operations e.g. the emphasis on static BMD operations rather than performing maneuver operations and ‘traditional air defence roles and tasks’. As a result, the overall SBAMD / IAMD proficiency for an ­effective task performance is significantly deteriorated. Finally, the continuous restructuring of NATO member states’ defence organizations, as well as continual budget cuts, have resulted in negative adjustments of ­avail­able resources and training and exercise opportunities. This has negatively influenced NATO’s capabilities and competencies to effectively conduct the full range of SBAMD / IAMD operations. These concerns in their entirety, call for a coherent and effective NATINAMDS as a vital component to the implementation of NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy (JAPS), which is currently under development, with ACT in the lead5. What is needed, more specifically, is a comprehensive NATO Anti Access / Aerial Denial (A2 / AD) capability in the form of a coherent and effective NATINAMDS and the personnel with the refined cognitive skills developed from executing air and missile defence as a priority on a daily basis.

The renewed emphasis on deterrence and collective defence in NATO is justified on the basis of the aforementioned causes. These factors have led to, among other things, reduced stability and security, increased ­un­predictability and a changed security environment in Europe. NATO, by its very nature, has the responsibility to prepare for any crisis and / or conflict. At the same time, it is important for NATO to preserve political consensus while the operational effectiveness of its NATINAMDS must improve. ­Politically, NATO must reconcile the self-induced paradox where, on the one hand it is adapting to the evolving security environment that ­demands the ability to meet both enduring and emerging threats of any kind and from any direction. While on the other hand, it must conform to its current policy in which missile defence must not be directed against Russia so not to undermine her strategic deterrence capabilities6. It is essential that the enhancement of NATINAMDS goes hand in hand with maintaining the US EPAA / Phases I to III). US EPAA does and will provide essential and unique SBAMD / IAMD capabilities, which are necessary for an effective and ­credible NATINAMDS. Simultaneously, NATO must keep the strategic ­dialogue with Russia open as much as possible. This dual track of demonstrating political will and military strength on one hand while expressing the desire to keep dialogue open with Russia on the other, might offer room for political solutions and help to revive strategic cooperation.

The planning, tasking and execution of SBAMD / IAMD at the military ­strategic, operational and tactical levels are interrelated and interdependent. It is especially visible in the interaction amongst the political and ­military strategic level guidance and command, the operational level planning, tasking and control, and the level of tactical control and execution. In peacetime, NATO focuses on air surveillance and air control (air policing) and on the standing BMD mission. In crisis and / or conflict the focus is on defending against or countering rockets and mortars, air breathing targets (cruise missiles, aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles), and ballistic missiles. Any operation responding to above mentioned threats can be conducted with an array of SBAMD systems in a layered defence of interconnected sensors, fused with shooters of adequate range and effectiveness7. It goes without saying that effective mission execution is not possible without proper Combat Support and Combat Service ­Support (e.g. Force Protection, Cyber Security, Space Support, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) and Logistics).

Aim

The real question is whether NATO currently has a credible and reliable SBAMD System as part of its IAMDS? The answer is ‘not quite yet’. There are urgent requirements throughout the NATINAMDS. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to determine the urgent short to medium term SBAMD / IAMD requirements thereby addressing key SBAMD shortfalls at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. It is these shortfalls that prevent NATO from effectively executing SBAMD / IAMDS in the short to medium term. In the scope of this article, it is not possible to cover this subject entirely; this would only be possible by preparing a complete inventory of existing shortfalls and validating the effectiveness at all levels of NATINAMDS.

This paper is intended to highlight urgent short to medium term SBAMD / IAMD priorities which have yet to be disclosed. However, con­sidering these new priorities with existing interoperability problems of legacy systems and current shortfalls with sensors, shooters and the ­diversity of surface based air defence and (T)BMD systems mentioned in this paper, serves to emphasize the need to take immediate action. In the short to medium term, it calls for focused attention by NATO in order to improve and strengthen NATINAMDS8.

Urgent SBAMD / IAMD Requirements

Leadership Development

A key area in need of attention and a requirement for all levels is leader­-ship development. Personnel engaged in all levels of SBAMD / IAMD are ­deficient to varying degrees in knowledge, competency and skill. The shortcomings are negatively impacting our leaders engaged in ­NATINAMDS, hampering their ability to deal with policy development and in decision-making; providing guidance and direction; planning and ­tasking; Command and Control (C2); and executing SBAMD / IAMD roles and tasks. Increased involvement and quality of NATO’s IAMD-leadership will lead to greater confidence throughout NATINAMDS in the ability of NATO to successfully conduct the full range of SBAMD / IAMD roles and tasks. Leaders at the political and military strategic level in NATO must take full responsibility. Currently, too much is left to the nations in the form of cooperation ­initiatives.

The short term, pertinent to the political and military strategic levels in NATO, requires taking the integral responsibility for the IAMD mission by setting readiness and sustainability goals for SBAMD-systems, and providing guidance and direction for the development of policies and plans. It includes assessing the requirements and nuances of the (T)BMD mission and determining the provisions for Indication and Warning (I&W); Pre-Planned Responses (PPRs); Rules of Engagement (RoE); and delegation of authority because of the short flight time of missiles. Political and military strategic leadership should also focus on providing guidance and direction for the development of Standing Plans for IAMD consequence management; passive air and missile defence procedures and requirements; Standing Plans for force protection of BMD resources; and for aligning and standardizing discrepancies in existing policy and doctrine documents, thereby preventing limitations in mission execution and improving understanding and communication among joint services.

At the operational and tactical levels, leadership is about the ability to ­adequately organize and implement operational and supporting pro­cesses, thereby creating the conditions for successful mission execution. It calls for professional task orientation, knowledge and skills to effectively carry out the responsibilities associated with the execution of the SBAMD roles and tasks. Improving leadership knowledge, skills and competencies is a necessary and continuous process, especially with a view to recovering the wide operational employability of NATINAMDS.

Readiness and sustainability goals must be demonstrated through clear objectives and requirements that will establish a shared sense of urgency; a focused operational mind-set; an increased operational readiness, ­employability and sustainability of allocated operational SBAMD-units. Achieved, these goals will revamp human resource requirements and education, training, exercising and validation efforts in NATO and requires agreements about the availability of Combat Service and Service Support. In the changed international security environment, this will lead to ­achieving the required levels of operational readiness and to sustainment of SBAMD-units in peacetime and, therefore enable instant access to ­deployable SBAMD units and their effects if the situation in NATO so ­requires9.

In the table on page 153, suggested readiness and sustainability goals are defined for different SBAMD Fire Units (FU). The columns show the potential readiness and sustainment goals. The first two rows show the recommended readiness goals for a Dutch Battalion with three Fire Units and a German Battalion with four Fire Units. The following rows show the proposed sustainment goals for respectively a German Battalion, a Dutch Battalion and a combined German / Dutch unit or task force. Suggested sustainment goals for Spanish and Greek units need to be determined, while the suggested sustainability goal for a US Battalion is 1,5 years or longer.

Although a combined DEU / NLD Bn has three Fire Units, it is the larger pool of available manpower that determines the sustainment period of one year.

ETEE

ETEE across all levels in NATINAMDS will ensure the prerequisite level of knowledge, competence and skill to effectively execute responsibilities in providing guidance and direction and for planning, tasking and executing SBAMD / IAMD roles and tasks. In recent years, because of aforementioned concerns, important areas of SBAMD / IAMD knowledge, skills and ex­perience have significantly faded. This demands a short to medium term restoration of NATO’s ETEE efforts in the SBAMD / IAMD-domain. Special attention should be given to minimizing existing foreign disclosure clauses and other barriers to collaboration among allies.

A limited number of SBAMD courses are available through the NATO School in Oberammergau. In the short term, SHAPE, together with ACT, should assess where and how improvement and broadening of SBAMD education, in the form of academic courses, is feasible. In this context, one can imagine, for example, of courses by single system users or from the perspective of a dissimilar SBAMD cluster. In establishing, conducting and sustaining courses, the Competence Centre for SBAMD (CC SBAMD) at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany could provide meaningful support to all components in NATINAMDS in the form of knowledge, experience and skills. However, this calls for an immediate completion of the Technical Agreement between NATO and the CC SBAMD; an undertaking that has been delayed for too long.

Exercising at the highest political and military strategic level encompasses the short term priority of conducting annual (T)BMD exercises with the participation of the permanent national representatives10. This provides the opportunity for senior leadership to gain a better understanding of this complicated mission and its complex issues. An example of a BMD exercise at this level is Nimble Titan, organized by US STRATCOM Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile defence (JFCC IMD). At the operational and tactical level a coherent set of exercises must be developed, organized and executed in order to improve individual and crew proficiencies at both levels. Allied Air Command initiated, and ­Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) supported, unit level SBAMD / IAMD computer-aided training and exercises must be introduced as part of the programme. Special focus must be given to better integrate legacy NATO SBAMD systems and to optimize their effectiveness. Furthermore, the next focus level is planning and executing integrated exercises of ­increasing complexity and scale to include joint / combined multi-level, cross domain networked training and exercises. Attention should also be given to the integration of EW and Cyber effects in the SBAMD training and exercise environment. Currently EW and Cyber training is insufficient and vulnerabilities are insufficiently known or not fully understood.

Finally, attention must be given to dissimilar SBAMD cluster exercises, whereby upper and lower layer capabilities will be connected and will ­establish a dedicated layered defence design. Specific attention must be given to connectivity, integration and coordination e.g. hand-over ­pro­cedures and responsibilities, and engagement coordination. Exercise Joint Project Optic Windmill (JPOW), organized by the Netherlands, is a great example of an operational / tactical level TBMD exercise. By adopting a credible and effective multi-layer training and exercise programme, the NATINAMDS as a whole will be more coherent, reliable and resilient.

Critical to achieving an effective training and exercise programme is a greater focus on evaluation and validation. The current system is ­insufficiently stringent. Operational evaluations are conducted only every five years, if at all, and, if desired, the evaluation criteria can be limited to a single capability. In such a case, it cannot be confirmed if an SBAMD unit is operationally ready to deploy and sustain a mission. We must have a ­dedicated Tactical evaluation system that frequently assesses and ­evaluates all SBAMD / IAMD functionalities, to confirm they are effective and can execute and sustain a mission. To this end, the Evaluation Branch at HQ Allied Air Command must be capable of regularly evaluating the operational readiness and mission operations capabilities and competencies of SBAMD units in NATO. This will necessitate greater interaction ­between Allied Air Command and the SBAMD nations.

Connectivity and Interoperability

While NATO Air C2 is addressed in a separate article, a few words about connectivity and interoperability in the SBAMD-environment is warranted in this paper. Both subjects are of great concern when it comes to re­storing the broad operational employability of NATINAMDS. Currently various components in NATINAMDS, the SBAMD-system connectivity and interoperability have shortfalls that must be remedied. First, although a national responsibility, the horizontal connection between SBAMD units and national support elements must be established in order to secure service support when needed. Second, some units have a limited number of link connections (link 1 or link 11 and 16). Legacy analogue landline ­connections are disappearing due to obsolescence and must be replaced with modern solutions (voice, PNVX, link 11 etc.). Third, interoperability with existing Control and Reporting Centre (CRC) is degraded and ­operational collaboration is hampered due to the limited availability of experienced Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM)-allocators at the CRC. NATO should assess the effectiveness of this inter-connection paying particular attention to mobile connectivity for deployed forces and to the external links to the Control and Reporting Centres, as well as to Allied Air Command. Overall, in the short term it is important is to re-assess the interoperability throughout NATINAMDS (including standards, interfaces, protocols, reliability, validating procedures etc.) and re-assess the coverage and effectiveness of the Communication and Information System Point of ­Presence concept provided by the NATO CIS Group.

Requirements (Options and Recommendations): Impact – Cost – Priorities

The table on page 159 provides a structured overview of the prioritization of the urgent short to medium term SBAMD / IAMD requirements. The main urgent shortfall areas mentioned in this article are numbered and explained starting on page 164. This matrix shows the relationship between impact and cost in determining the priority of each requirement which leads to a priority indication. In the context of this article, impact, cost and priority are defined as follows:

Impact: low, medium and high.

  • Low means a low effect on the improvement of the capabilities of SBAMD / IAMD and increasing SBAMD knowledge.
  • Medium implies not a great effect, but still significant.
  • High means a great effect on the capabilities of SBAMD / IAMD and ­increasing SBAMD knowledge and skills.

Cost: low, medium and high.

  • Low: less than 1M €.
  • Medium: 1–10M €.
  • High: more than 10M €.

Within the context of this paper low and medium cost are defined as ­affordable cost. The affordability of medium cost assumes a high impact relationship.

Priority: The priority of the recommendations ranges from 1 to 4.

  • Prio 1 means: high impact – low cost and high impact – medium cost. Rationale: medium cost is affordable.
  • Prio 2 means: medium impact – low cost and medium impact – medium cost. Rationale: Medium impact is still significant.
  • Prio 3 means: medium impact – high cost and high impact – high cost.
  • Prio 4 means: low impact – high cost.

Other criteria: Besides impact and cost, the SBAMD / IAMD priorities must meet the following criteria:

  • First, have strategic implication, which is related to a high and medium impact on the improvement of SBAMD capabilities and increasing knowledge and skills.
  • Second, preferably the solutions must be joint / combined in nature.
  • Third, the solutions to the shortfalls should be actionable and achiev­able.

This leads to the following of urgent short to medium term SBAMD / IAMD requirements and priorities.

The prioritization matrix reveals a number of interesting findings:

First, almost all requirements, if rectified, will significantly improve NATO’s SBAMD / IAMD capabilities and competencies. Second, leadership ­development and ETEE requirements are competency oriented, while improving connectivity and interoperability are predominant ­capability orientated. Third, the majority of the recommendations are priority 1 and 2. This is where NATO’s should focus its immediate ­attention. Fourth, quite a significant number of requirements can be ­addressed without incurring high costs, are part of the daily routine tasks / duties and responsibilities, or simply require the will to make things happen (e.g. development of doctrine, standards and Standing Defence Plans. Leadership development at the political and military ­strategic levels can be organized at very low cost if the will exists to make it happen. Establishing a broader array of SBAMD courses is feasible ­without extensive cost, especially if sufficient cooperation can be achieved between like-minded organizations). Fifth, requirement numbers 2, 8 and 9c are actually collections of requirements, for which the combined cost to resolve would be high. This does not preclude ­selecting specified requirements and their corresponding solutions such that the costs can be held to low or medium. Sixth, although high impact and high cost combined together form priority 3, the high impact alone implies a significant effect on the capabilities of SBAMD / IAMD and toward improving SBAMD knowledge and skill levels. On this basis, if the conditions allow, there is sufficient justification to take appropriate ­action. Seventh, the cost indicator is an initial, rough categorization that needs further refinement in the follow-up process.

Most probably, the main costs are related to establishing readiness and sustainability; developing and conducting integrated combat training and exercises, especially the more complex multi-level, cross domain ­networked SBAMD / IAMD exercises; and re-connectivity and interoperability throughout NATINAMDS. How high the actual cost will be cannot currently be specified, but it is assumed that this remains within ­acceptable limits. Most important is the impact all these measures will have towards achieving a credible, effective and reliable NATINAMDS as a key pillar of NATO’s deterrence and collective defence posture.

Conclusion

One of the Strategic Focus Areas in the Warsaw Summit Communiqué is Missile Defence. The recent changes in the international security situation have led to a renewed emphasis in NATO on deterrence and collective defence. In order to meet the challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction the explicit focus in NATO on (T)BMD must be expanded to include SBAMD as part of NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System. This will lead to the establishment of an operationally ready, ­credible and effective NATINAMDS, a key pillar for the successful execution of NATO’s Joint Air Power Strategy.

The majority of the priority requirements listed in this paper are primarily targeted on improving NATO’s SBAMD capabilities as part of NATINAMDS. Many of the urgent short to medium term requirements are priority 1 and 2, which means that they refer to a high impact for relatively low cost or a high impact at medium cost (priority 1) or a medium impact at low cost and a medium impact at medium cost (priority 2). Most priority 1 and 2 requirements are directly achievable. Therefore, in the short term, NATO’s attention should focus on these requirements and because, once ­remedied, they will significantly improve the effectiveness and credibility of NATO’s SBAMD / IAMD capabilities and competencies in support of ­NATO’s deterrence and collective defence posture.

The most important shortfall area listed in this article are: leadership ­development, ETEE and connectivity and interoperability. Other critical requirements (such as additional sensors and shooters, strategic transport, more human resources for sustained operations, force protection, ­enhanced cyber security etc. …) are acknowledged but outside the scope of this paper since they are undoubtedly already well-known to the corresponding responsible agencies within NATO. However, while they are not mentioned more thoroughly does not make them any less important. When resolved, it is assessed that the requirements listed in this paper will significantly improve the operational effectiveness of NATO’s SBAMD / IAMD capability. It is believed that the requirements may be completed in an affordable way in the short to medium term. For these reasons, addressing the SBAMD / IAMD requirements mentioned in this paper must be of a high priority and is an attractive Course of Action (COA) for NATO.

Overall, large steps forward can be made with respect to ‘credibility in ­response’ if, in the short term, NATO expedites confirming the proposals and moves quickly to implementing the solutions.

Recommendations

Taking into account the urgent SBAMD priorities mentioned in this paper the following main recommendations apply:

First, broaden the knowledge and experience of NATO leadership at all levels in the SBAMD / IAMD-domain. Strengthening the ability and com­petencies of leadership will enable them to provide focused direction and guidance, and organize and implement operational and supporting ­processes, while setting the conditions for successful SBAMD / IAMD ­mission execution in NATO.

Second, optimize and enhance SBAMD / IAMD-ETEE which will lead to a corps of personnel with greater knowledge, competencies and skills to effectively perform responsibilities at the strategic level, but also in the planning, tasking and execution of SBAMD roles and tasks at the operational and tactical levels.

Third, set overall conditions and begin the process of overhauling the ­connectivity and interoperability throughout the NATINAMDS system.

Fourth, remedy the specified requirements with a priority 1 and 2 as a ­matter of urgency.

Fifth, it is recommended to conduct an integral assessment of existing SBAMD / IAMD shortfalls and a validation of the effectiveness at all levels of NATINAMDS. On the basis of the findings targeted action must be taken in direct cooperation with the SBAMD / IAMD community in NATO.

Attachment A – Overview of Urgent Short to Medium-Term SBAMD / IAMD Requirements

The paper addresses the three main areas of urgent short to medium-term SBAMD / IAMD requirements:

Leadership development, with the need:

  • To broaden the knowledge and experience of NATO leadership at all ­levels in the SBAMD / IAMD-domain in order to strengthen the ability and competencies to provide focused direction and guidance, and organize and implement operational and supporting processes, thereby setting the conditions for effective SBAMD / IAMD mission execution in NATO.

ETEE, with the need:

  • To further optimize and enhance SBAMD / IAMD-ETEE which will lead to more knowledge, competencies and skills to effectively perform ­responsibilities in the planning, tasking and execution of SBAMD roles and tasks.

Connectivity and interoperability, with the need:

  • To set the overall conditions to address connectivity and interoperability shortfalls throughout the SBAMD / IAMD system to achieve a robust and reliable NATINAMDS.

Specified requirements. Each of the three main shortfall areas share a number of specific requirements11:

Leadership development. Specified requirements are:

  • (1) NATO leadership at the political and military strategic level must ­acknowledge and accept their part of the responsibility for the SBAMD / IAMD mission. This includes:
    • (2) Setting readiness and sustainability goals for SBAMD-systems.
    • (3) Assessing the requirements and nuances of the BMD / TBMD ­mission and determining the provisions for I&W; PPRs; RoE; and ­Delegation of Authority.
  • Providing guidance and direction for:
    • (4a) Developing Standing Plans for BMD / TBMD consequence manage­ment.
    • (4b) Developing passive defence procedures and requirements.
    • (4c) Developing Standing Plans for force protection of BMD assets.
    • (4d) Aligning and standardizing discrepancies in existing policy and doctrine.
    • At the operational and tactical levels, the requirements for leadership development shortfall focus on the need:
      • (5) To adequately organize and implement operational and supporting processes.

ETEE. The specified requirements in this main area concern the need:

  • To revamp NATO’s ETEE efforts in the SBAMD / IAMD-domain. This includes:
    • (6a) SHAPE together with ACT assessing in the short term where and how improvement and broadening of SBAMD education in the form of academic courses are feasible (e.g. of courses by single system users or a dissimilar SBAMD cluster).
    • (6b) Setting the conditions for effective cooperation between NATO School SHAPE in Oberammergau and the CC SBAMD at Ramstein Air Force Base in Germany.
    • (6c) Completing in a timely manner the Technical Agreement between NATO and the CC SBAMD.
  • At the highest political and military strategic level there is the need:
    • (7) To conduct an annual (T)BMD exercise with the participation of the permanent national representatives12.
  • At the operational and tactical level the specified requirements focus on:
    • (8) Developing, organizing and executing a coherent set of exercises and a system of evaluation and validation in order to improve the individual and crew proficiencies at both levels:
      • (8a) Developing, organizing and executing Allied Air Command initiated and CAOC supported, unit level SBAMD / IAMD computer aided training and exercises.
      • (8b) Planning and execution of integrated exercises in increasing complexity and scale to include joint / combined, multi-level, cross- domain and networked training and exercises. Special ­attention should be given to minimizing existing foreign ­disclosure clauses and other barriers to collaboration among ­Allies.
      • (8c) Integrating EW and Cyber effects in the SBAMD training and exercise environment.
      • (8d) Planning, organizing and executing dissimilar SBAMD cluster exercises, whereby upper and lower tier capabilities will be ­connected and will establish a dedicated, layered defence design.
      • (8e) Developing the Evaluation Branch at HQ Allied Air Command into a full- fledged Tactical evaluation organization in order to ­frequently evaluate the operational readiness and mission operations capabilities and competencies of SBAMD units in NATO, and consequently intensifying the collaboration between Allied Air Command and the SBAMD nations.

Connectivity and interoperability. Requirements in this area focus on the need:

  • To restore the broad operational employability of NATINAMDS by ­remedying, the SBAMD-system connectivity and interoperability ­deficiencies. This includes:
    • (9a) Establishing the horizontal connection between SBAMD units and national support elements and, thereby, setting the conditions for an assured service support when needed.
    • (9b) Optimizing the existing up-link connections (link 1 or link 11 and 16).
    • (9c) Replacing obsolete analogue landline connections (voice, PNVX etc.) with state-of-the art / modern technology.
    • (9d) Optimizing interoperability with existing CRC.
    • (9e) Strengthening the availability of experienced SAM-allocators at CRC-level.
    • (9f) Assessing the effectiveness and focusing on mobile connectivity for deployed forces and the external links to the Control and Reporting Centres that still exist and to Allied Air Command.
    • (9g) Overall, in the near term, assessing the interoperability throughout NATINAMDS (standards, interfaces etc.) and re-assessing the ­coverage and effectiveness of the Communication and Information System Point of Presence concept provided by the NATO CIS Group.
While NATO’s BMD focuses on the protection of NATO European populations, territory and forces against the full spectrum of ballistic missile threats, the focus of Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (TBMD) is directed to the protection of deployed NATO forces and High Value Assets and Areas. Both, BMD and TBMD, require the establishment of a multi-layered synergistic defence architecture.
In the remainder of this article called (T)BMD.
In the context of this paper IAMD focuses on and is limited to the capabilities and competencies linked to Surface Based Air and Missile Defence (SBAMD).
In particular Russian Aerospace Forces and Strategic Rocket Forces.
The IAMD Strategy focuses on the end, ways and means that support NATO’s Air Cdr in achieving his IAMD campaign goals in support of higher level military- and political-strategic guidelines and objectives.
2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué § 59.
Surface Based Air and Missile Defence comprises all defensive measures originating from the surface – land and maritime – ­designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air action (to include: BMD, TBMD, Cruise Missiles, Counter Rockets and Mortars (CRAM), Army Organic Air Defence (AOAD), Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD), Maritime Anti air Warfare and defence against Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS). It goes without saying that aircraft, space support and cyber security play an important role in effectively conducting SBAMD operations. Aircraft and space support are outside the scope of this paper.
When addressing the shortfalls in SBAMD sensors and shooters NATO is advised to also consider active decoys.
This will lead to operationally ready SBAMD forces which, if necessary, can support the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. When deploying, this Task Force most probably needs dedicated SBAMD for protecting its deployed forces.
It is suggested to link this annual high level exercise with the important Steadfast Alliance exercise with the goal to practice this framework while factoring in political and military strategic direction and guidance.
The numbers in brackets correspond to the numbering of the requirements (options and recommendations) in the prioritization matrix of this article.
It is suggested to link this yearly high level exercise with the important Stead Fast Alliance exercise with the goal to practice in this framework also political and military strategic direction and guidance.
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Author
Lieutenant General (ret.)
 Frederik H.
 Meulman
Royal Netherlands Air Force

Lieutenant General (ret.) F. H. (Frederik) Meulman ­graduated from the Royal Military Academy in 1979, after which he held a number of positions with the fifth Guided Missile Group in Germany. He attended the Advanced Staff Course (1988–1990), after which he studied Strategy and Air Power at the Air Univer­sity / College for Aerospace Doctrine, Research and ­Education at Maxwell Air Force Base in the United States. Subsequently, he was posted to the Netherlands Defense College as a ­faculty member. Thereafter, he worked alternately in conceptual, ­operational and policy positions both at the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and the Air Staff. From 1998 to 2000, Colonel Meulman was Commander of the Netherlands Guided Missile Group. In 2000, he returned to the MOD/Defense Staff as Head of the Military-Strategic Affairs Division. In 2001, promoted to Air Commodore, he assumed the position of Deputy Director of the Military Intelligence and Security Service. In 2003, Major General Meulman became Deputy Commander of the Combined Air ­Operations Centre in Kalkar (CAOC2). From June 2004 to the end of 2006, he was the Deputy Commander of the Royal Netherlands Air Force. From January 2007 until February 2008, Meulman fulfilled the position of ­Deputy Commander Air at the ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. March 2008, Major General Meulman was appointed Deputy Chief of ­Defense and promoted to Lieutenant General. From April 2010 till May 2013, he was the Netherlands Permanent Military Representative to NATO and the EU in Brussels. He retired per 1st of June 2013. General Meulman published a wide variety of articles on strategy, strategy development and in particular joint air power and was the project leader of the JAPPC study on ‘Air and Space Power in NATO – Future Vector’.

Information provided is current as of October 2017

Other Chapters in this Book

Executive Summary and Key Recommendations

Introduction

The Role of NATO Joint Air Power in Deterrence and Collective Defence

Deterrence and ­Collective Defence

Joint ISR and Air C2

Hybrid Conflict, Hybrid Warfare and Resilience

Urgent Joint Air Power Priorities

Alliance and Partnership Cooperation

Bridging Mutual Joint Air Power Interests

Industrial and ­Technology Cooperation

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