This White Paper assesses dependencies stated in national and relevant NATO doctrine. It addresses Space functional areas and their importance based on current and historical NATO operations. A wide threat assessment is undertaken, based on the capability as well as the foreseeable threats in different operation types and intensities. Potential outcomes are discussed and addressed.
The Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC) was formally established on 1 January 2005 to provide the strategic level proponent for Joint Air and Space Power that was missing in NATO. Soon thereafter, JAPCC was accredited as NATO’s first Centre of Excellence (COE) and, as such, is charged with the development of innovative concepts and solutions required for the transformation of Joint Air and Space Power within the Alliance and the Nations.
The aim of this report is to show how ‘close support’ mission operations in the future may be drastically different than what the Alliance has conducted over the last 30 years. It addresses potential shortfalls in available assets resulting in close support coverage limitations. It also portrays the potential challenges of providing close support to troops in areas that are highly contested. The report references emerging and future joint military technologies and weapon systems to help solve both coverage gap and contested environment challenges. It concludes with considerations for Alliance transformation at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.
This white paper aims at providing a reasoned compendium about SST and multinational SST networks. In particular, it addresses the analysis of several architectural solutions for SST networks to identify and evaluate applicable C2 models. The document starts with a knowledge base about SST and its contribution to SSA. It defines the relevant terms of reference and describes its applications, both for civil and military purposes. It also illustrates the architecture of a generic SST system and provides several examples of existing national and multinational SST endeavours, with particular reference to the European Union (EU) SST framework. Finally, it provides a NATO perspective on emerging multinational SST endeavours, providing advice on why and how NATO should try to promote such agreements.
The subject of Counter-Unmanned Air Systems (C-UAS) has become what can best be described as a ‘hot-topic’, not just for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) but, globally. The primary question that this think-piece seeks to explore is whether this challenge is new and unique or, whether it is actually just one of many threats that NATO faces that can be addressed with a little intellectual effort and with existing technology or, novel use of existing technology?
Future Battlefield Rotorcraft Capability Anno 2035 and Beyond Forecasting the future is a daunting task, however, identified fast-moving trends across the diplomatic, information, military, and economic subjects are rapidly transforming the nature of all aspects of society and human life, including the character of warfare. To be prepared for the future to come, national and…
Given the strategic nature of airbases and the vulnerability of most, if not all of the assets grouped on them, it is apparent that the methods of protecting them will have to become much better. As a key component, this process will require dedicated, air-minded Force Protection (FP) forces that are specifically trained and organised for the task.
One method of quickly employing ground forces is through airmobile operations. When airmobile forces are employed by helicopter, part of their equipment is transported as an Underslung Load (USL) underneath the helicopter. For NATO forces to operate in a combined manner, it is essential that the equipment of one nation be transportable by the helicopters of another nation. Although Helicopter Underslung Load Equipment (HUSLE) and helicopter USL standards are available and approved in NATO, interoperability appears to be limited.
As a vital component in the projection of Air Power, Cyberspace has surpassed its mark as an enabler, now recognized as not only critical to mission assurance but a Domain of operations in itself. Consequently, it is critical that the systems operating in Cyberspace be secure, reliable and available and establishing these criteria by employing defensive measures alone may be insufficient.
Network technology is expanding at an exponential rate. As technology improves, effectively unlimited connectivity is no longer strictly a future concept; however, combined decision-making and data sharing processes (or maybe ‘protocols’) are not evolving at the same speed as technology. Machines will boost communication in a networked environment to levels yet to be determined. This will require nations and the Alliance to alter current communication patterns.