The JAPCC intends with this document not to write a broad NATO policy, but to help readers understand the operational impact of realistic and achievable specifically targeted policy prescriptions. The following proposal is intentionally narrow in scope and concentrated on the employment, coordination and defence of space capabilities used to support NATO operations and core business.
NATO depends greatly on space capabilities to achieve its political aims. While the Alliance has yet to fully come to grips with the implications of its reliance on space capabilities, there are signs pointing to improved orchestration, defence and employment of NATO space capabilities. The most important of these could be efforts to formalise the NATO Space Integrated Project Team (IPT) led by Allied Command Transformation.
A task force of nine NATO nations and Australia (BLUE) battled a combination of terrorists, pirates and affiliated third parties (RED) during the world’s premier space and cyberspace wargame conducted by U.S. Air Force Space Command and hosted by the U.S. Air Force Warfare Center. Set in 2023, Schriever Wargame 2012 International (SW 12 International) offered NATO an unprecedented opportunity to explore combined space operations within a NATO construct.
In this edition of the Journal we offer our analysis of counter-piracy operations and provide you with an update to this delicate issue. Our Maritime Air expert will present the key results of an experiment conducted in gaining insights into potential commitment levels of A&S ISR platforms in the Region off the Horn of Africa.
The aim of this paper is to describe a RFP concept to share costs across common fighter aircraft capabilities and their enabling aspects, including logistics, maintenance and training, whilst keeping national sovereign command over assets. The focus is on CEE nations willing to pool and share resources that supports basic national requirements for air policing, precision strike and Close Air Support (CAS) of ground forces.
2011 was a challenging year for the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC). We completed a number of important projects as well as sustained our participation in many NATO activities. Our annual conference was one of the year’s highlights along with a visit from a Russian Federation delegation. JAPCC also produced two Journals and many other products with which the Centre has once again emphasised its attention to all related Air and Space matters. Combined, these projects, activities, and events contribute to the overall program of work for the JAPCC.
Logistics is of vital importance to any military operation. Without it, operations cannot be carried out or sustained. Most operations start at home base and use a combination of strategic, operational and tactical movement to move forward into the Area of Operations (AOO). The greater the scope and the size of the operation, theoretically, the greater the reliance on Movement and Transportation (M&T) and logistics resources for deployment, sustainment and redeployment. The Logistics effort for Operation Unified Protector (OUP) appeared to succeed, but has NATO missed an opportunity?
This edition contains submissions from Australia, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. I want to especially thank our contributors, and I hope you feel inspired to further debate the topics inside these pages. Your thoughts and ideas will help shape the future of Air and Space Power.
This AT Assessment is a source document with the principal aim of underscoring the importance of Strategic and Tactical AT by raising awareness of current and emerging AT issues across the NATO community. This Assessment describes and analyses the current NATO military AT inventory and supporting multinational agencies, identifies problems and recommends possible solutions. Ultimately, this AT Assessment endeavours to contribute to standardisation and interoperability across the Alliance.
This publication provides a summary of the Air and Space (A&S) Power contribution to NATO’s approach to Counter Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED) operations.